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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ORIGINS OF THE 1897 OTTOMAN-GREEK WAR: 
A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 
 
Ekinci, Mehmet Uğur 
M.A., Department of History 
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Mehmet Kalpaklı 
 
July 2006 
 
 
 This thesis, pertaining to the underlying factors and developments of the 
Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, focuses primarily on the political and diplomatic 
proceedings that took place between the Greek occupation of Crete on 13 February 
and the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire on 17 April. This war broke out, 
against the will of the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, as an outgrowth of 
the irredentist policies of Greece. The Ottoman Empire expected that the Great 
Powers would prevent war, but since the Powers could not take a unanimous 
decision for undertaking coercive measures on Greece, they left the two states 
alone. The Ottomans were willing to preserve peace, yet they finally declared war 
on Greece after the bands of Greek irregulars crossed the border. This monograph, 
based on a multi-sided bibliography including Ottoman and British official 
documents, intends to shed some light on the international politics of the time.  
 
Keywords: 1897, Ottoman Empire, Greece, Concert of Europe, Abdülhamid II, 
Deligiannis, Ethnike Hetairia, Crete, Thessaly. 
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ÖZET 
 
1897 OSMANLI-YUNAN SAVAŞI’NIN KÖKENLERİ:  
BİR DİPLOMATİK TARİHÇE 
 
Ekinci, Mehmet Uğur 
Master, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Mehmet Kalpaklı 
 
Temmuz 2006 
 
 
 1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Savaşı’nı hazırlayan faktör ve gelişmeleri konu 
edinen bu çalışmada esas olarak Yunanistan’ın Girit’i işgal ettiği 13 Şubat ile 
Osmanlı Devleti’nin savaş ilânına karar verdiği 17 Nisan tarihleri arasında 
meydana gelen siyasî ve diplomatik gelişmeler üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu savaş, 
Osmanlı Devleti ve Büyük Devletler’in irâdesine aykırı olarak Yunanistan’ın 
yayılmacı politikalarının bir neticesi olarak meydana gelmiştir. Osmanlı Devleti 
Büyük Devletler’den savaşı engellemelerini beklemiş; fakat bu devletler 
Yunanistan’a uygulanacak zorlayıcı tedbirler üzerinde uzlaşamadıklarından iki 
devleti yalnız başlarına bırakmışlardır. Osmanlı Devleti barışın devamından yana 
olmasına rağmen Yunan çetelerinin sınırı tecavüz etmesi üzerine Yunanistan’a 
savaş ilân etmiştir. Başta Osmanlı ve İngiliz belgeleri olmak üzere çok yönlü bir 
kaynakça kullanılarak hazırlanmış olan bu monograf ile dönemin uluslararası 
politikalarına ışık tutulması amaçlanmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: 1897, Osmanlı Devleti, Yunanistan, Avrupa İttihâdı, II. 
Abdülhamid, Deligiannis, Etniki Eterya, Girit, Tesalya. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In February 1897, shortly after the Christians in the Ottoman island of Crete 
had initiated an insurrection, the Greek government sent a fleet and military units 
to this island. Facing the occupation of Crete, the Ottoman Empire did not declare 
war on Greece and expected a peaceful settlement of the problem. Both states 
concentrated troops on their side of the border against the possibility of war. The 
crisis on the border escalated for about two months. After a couple of raids by 
Greek irregulars into their territory, the Ottomans finally declared war on 17 April. 
The war continued for one month. Although the Ottoman troops had occupied 
almost the entire Thessaly at the cessation of hostilities, the frontiers before the war 
were restored with minor changes in the peace treaty, according to the will of the 
Great Powers.  
Although this ephemeral war was an unequal contest of two neighboring 
states in Southeastern Europe, it still occupied a noteworthy place within world 
power politics of the time. While the six Great Powers, namely Austria-Hungary, 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, had control over almost every single 
international development in the world, the progress of events between the Cretan 
crisis and the outbreak of the war did not suit with their interests at all. None of the 
Powers desired to see an Ottoman-Greek war. Though for a short period, the 
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cabinets in Europe spent considerable effort to prevent it. But when they realized 
that the measures they could take would not be able to appease the Greeks, the 
Powers let the war happen, with the precondition that it would not change the 
balances in the region.  
The Ottoman Empire did not have any intention to go to war with Greece, 
either. Especially Sultan Abdülhamid II had always been extremely careful to 
maintain peaceful relations with other states, as he feared that the empire did not 
have enough resources to cope with a serious military threat.1 The severe defeat 
against Russia in 1878 and its injurious consequences had led him to keep away 
from all forms of international adventurism and polarization and to follow an 
absolutely peaceful foreign policy.2 This is why he often resorted to concessions 
whenever it became obvious that diplomatic initiatives would not yield any result. 
The sultan consented to the de facto losses of Tunisia to France (1881), Thessaly to 
Greece (1881), Egypt to Britain (1882) and Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria (1885) 
with little opposition in order to decrease the tension in the empire’s foreign 
affairs.3 When Crete was occupied by Greek troops, the sultan preserved his 
caution and instead of resorting to force, he left the settlement of this problem to 
the Great Powers. Although he ordered the dispatch of a massive armed force to the 
Greek border, the sultan never had any intention for an offensive. The war was 
declared only after the raids from the Greek side of the border began to menace the 
security and reputation of the empire.  
The main responsibility for the war lay on the shoulders of Greece, 
particularly the Greek public, who had kept a burning desire for the materialization 
of the Megale Idea, and the Ethnike Hetairia, which endeavored to accomplish this 
goal. The Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, though arising out of the Cretan crisis, was 
                                                 
1
 F. A. K. Yasamee, “Ottoman Diplomacy in the Era of Abdülhamid II (1878-1908),” in Çağdaş 
Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, edited by İsmail Soysal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 
227. 
2
 Selim Deringil, “Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and İsmet 
İnönü,” in International Journal of Turkish Studies 4: 1 (Summer 1987), 39. 
3
 Süleyman Kocabaş, Sultan II. Abdülhamid: Şahsiyeti ve Politikası (İstanbul: Vatan, 1995), 205. 
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in fact one of the recurring attempts of Greece in the nineteenth century for 
territorial enlargement. The Greeks had made three, almost identical, attempts in 
the years 1854, 1878 and 1886. None of these attempts had resulted in war with the 
Ottomans, thanks to the intervention of the Great Powers, and the Greeks had even 
acquired a sizeable territory in 1881. As the Great Powers were in competition over 
Africa and East Asia, and the Ottoman Empire was coping with numerous internal 
problems, the Greeks hoped that they could acquire Epirus, or even Macedonia 
through a threat to general peace. However, neither their occupation of Crete, nor 
their military preparations produced a compromise from any of these states. 
Diplomatic efforts by the Powers and the Ottoman Empire were not able to 
persuade the Greeks to retreat on their policy. The crisis escalated constantly, and 
the activities of the relentless Ethnike Hetairia kindled the flames of war in the end.  
The number of studies that especially pertain to the Ottoman-Greek War of 
1897 is not very high. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be many ambiguities on 
this war in the historical literature, due to its limited nature in terms of time, area 
and impact. In addition, sources that provide partial information on the war are 
abundant. Apart from the official documents in the Ottoman, Greek and European 
archives, there are numerous secondary sources that deal with various aspects of 
this incident. Nevertheless, most of the studies on this war have been written by 
putting one state, or a few of states, at the center of events and evaluating the 
proceedings from that standpoint. For example, Greek scholars have usually 
understated the role of Greek government in the origins of the war, and charged the 
responsibility for the disaster almost entirely on the Ethnike Hetairia. On the other 
hand, most of the Turkish sources, both contemporary and later, portray the belief 
that the Great Powers were always in pursuit of a pro-Greek and anti-Ottoman 
policy. In addition, studies based on British official documents are written with 
observable suspicion towards Russia and Germany; while those based on Western 
European archives accommodate considerable disdain towards the Ottomans. 
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Because of such prejudices one often encounters contradictory statements in 
different sources.  
Although the Ottoman Empire was one of the two sides of the conflict, 
Ottoman sources were usually neglected by Greek or European scholars that 
studied Ottoman-Greek War of 1897. Even Theodoros G. Tatsios, the author of one 
of the most comprehensive works on this war, rightly acknowledges the deficiency 
of his book resulting from the omission of Ottoman documents.4 On the other hand, 
studies that have been conducted by Turkish scholars are generally prejudiced by 
the Ottoman perspective, since they are based, almost exclusively, on sources in 
Turkish. A recent book by M. Metin Hülagü5 is a typical example for the latter. 
This work is a fairly detailed account of the origins, course and aftermath of the 
war based on an extensive collection of primary and secondary sources in Turkish. 
But since this study lacks investigation of European sources, it remains somewhat 
one-sided and incomplete. Ideally, the better account of the war, as well as its 
origins and aftermath, would integrate the information yielded by Ottoman sources 
to the historical literature based on European ones, and evaluate the developments 
in a critical and comparative outlook.  
The aim of this thesis is to present the origins of the Ottoman-Greek War of 
1897 from a multi-sided perspective. Since the war was caused by the aggressive 
policy of Greece, the second chapter of the thesis is devoted to the political culture 
and foreign policy of this state, with special emphasis on the underlying factors of 
Greek irredentism, which paved the way to war. In the third chapter the Cretan 
crisis, which was the antecedent of the Ottoman-Greek War, will be discussed. The 
main part of the thesis is the fourth chapter, which focuses on the diplomatic and 
political developments between the Greek occupation of Crete (13 February 1897) 
                                                 
4
 Theodore George Tatsios, The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the 
Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), 
viii. 
5
 M. Metin Hülagü, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri Çerçevesinde 1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Savaşı (Kayseri: 
Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2001). 
 5 
and the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire (17 May 1897) in detail. The 
final chapter includes some concluding remarks along with brief information on the 
course of war and its aftermath.   
The attitudes and actions of the Ottoman Empire on the road to war are 
investigated mainly in the Ottoman archival documents and the two contemporary 
accounts written by Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî6 and Vecîhî et al.7 The 
information on the proceedings among the Great Powers is based on published 
British documents, a selective collection of German documents and the world-
renowned book by William L. Langer.8 The excellent multi-volume work written 
conjointly by Driault and Lhéritier,9 the diligent study of Papadopoulos based on 
unpublished British documents10 and the monograph of Tatsios are utilized 
extensively to trace the policies of not only the Great Powers, but also Greece. In 
addition, a large collection of other sources are utilized in order to verify and 
support the information yielded by the abovementioned documents and works and, 
hence, to reach more reliable conclusions. It is a regret for the author that Russian 
sources pertaining to the war, which could give a more complete picture of the 
diplomatic developments, are not consulted.  
All of the dates in this thesis are given in the Gregorian calendar, even 
though different calendars were being used in both Greece and the Ottoman Empire 
at that time. The names of people and places are usually based on the spelling in 
their original language. Alternative usages of place names, if any, are given in 
parentheses. 
                                                 
6
 Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühdî, Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye ve Yunan Muhârebesi 
(İstanbul: Mihran, 1315). 
7
 Vecîhî ve Rüfekâsı [Vecîhî, et al.], Musavver Tarih-i Harb (İstanbul: İkdâm, 1315). 
8
 William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism: 1890-1902 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1968). 
9
 Édouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours 
(Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1926). 
10
 G. S. Papadopoulos, England and the Near East: 1896-1898 (Thessaloniki: Hetaireia 
Makedonikon Spoudon, 1969). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE POLITICAL CULTURE IN GREECE AND GREEK 
FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
The Ottoman-Greek War of 1897 is an outgrowth of the nineteenth-century 
Greek foreign policy. Neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Great Powers desired to 
see this war happen, but their efforts to prevent it proved insufficient against the 
determination of the Greeks to fight. Even though the king and government in 
Greece showed a mixed attitude towards war during the escalation of crisis, their 
irredentist and nationalist policy, which had continued for decades, rendered a 
major military conflict with the Ottoman Empire inevitable. At first sight, it might 
be difficult to understand why such a small state having limited economic and 
military capabilities adopted such a daring foreign policy with little hesitation. In 
order to understand this, tracing the development of Greek political culture after the 
foundation of modern Greece is essential. 
 
 
2. 1. The Evolution of Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy 
 
Greece was a peculiar state both in its foundation and development. This is 
because, it was not established after a successful revolution supported by a sound 
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enterprise;1 but rather as a result of the mutual endeavor shown by the Great 
Powers to keep the existing balance of power within European politics. Indeed, no 
matter how much the Greek rebellion was the first step for the separation of Greece 
from the Ottoman Empire, the understanding between Russia, Britain and France 
played the key role on the foundation of the modern Greek state. In accordance 
with the interests of these three Powers, Greece was formed as a monarchy under a 
dynasty of Western European origin instead of a republic under the political will of 
the Greek population. After creating this state, these Powers also spent 
considerable effort to offset its poor economic and political conditions; since 
Greece neither had enough economic power, nor political stability, even to survive.  
Regardless of these problems, Greek politicians and public stuck to the 
dream of territorial enlargement for the sake of liberating their compatriots abroad. 
The “Megale Idea,” namely the idea of uniting the whole Greek community under 
one flag, was pursued by the modern Greek state right after its establishment, and 
this national dream proved to be the leading element within the domestic and 
foreign policy of Greece for decades. The artificial nature of the modern Greek 
state, the opportunism of the Greek politicians and the existence of an extreme 
degree of rapport within the Greek community were the principal reasons for the 
development of this expansionist and irredentist policy.  
When founded in 1830 as a nation-state, Greece was far from what the 
Greek revolutionaries had dreamed of and worked for since the beginning of their 
insurrection. Their goal was the independence of the whole Greek community; yet 
what they achieved in the end was a rump state comprising only one-fourth of the 
Greek population in the world. Around 2,000,000 Greeks still remained in both 
                                                 
1
 The Greek rebellion, which broke out in 1821, was in fact a leaderless and generally unorganized 
movement with no vital sources or national exchequer which could enable a protracted struggle: 
John Alexander Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1944), 1. Hence the Greek onslaught was checked by Ottoman forces within a few 
months and conflicts in the Greek mainland went on as a stalemate until the intervention of the 
European Powers in October 1827. 
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Ottoman territories and the British-held Ionian Islands.2 As a result, the Greeks 
who had been able to obtain independence set themselves to “redeem their 
enslaved brethren abroad.” This ambition shortly became the central element of 
Greek political culture. With the belief that the adventurous prospect of the Megale 
Idea made “their otherwise mundane existence” meaningful,3 the common people 
in Greece aimed towards a shared objective as a coherent society.      
Despite all foreign oppositions and the precarious financial and military 
status of Greece, Greek politicians uniformly kept enunciating irredentist and pan-
Hellenist claims. In a state which was established after a nationalist struggle, 
adopting such a policy was obviously an easy way of obtaining popular support. 
Since the Greek society had no aristocracy or plutocracy to stabilize public opinion, 
“the passionate and unreliable mob of Athens” enjoyed an enormous political 
influence.4 Thanks to the strong cultural and commercial relationships between 
Greeks who lived in and outside Greece, the political party which most eagerly 
defended the Megale Idea received the greatest support from the Greek public.  
The conception of the Megale Idea accommodated a certain degree of 
variation. While it generally referred to incorporation of the Aegean Islands and the 
provinces north of Greece to the motherland, in some circles it was extended into 
an imperialistic program for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire by subjugating 
the other Balkan peoples to Hellenism.5 After the 1850s, the Greeks tried to 
legitimize their irredentist policies by emphasizing the role of Greece between the 
East and the West and the country’s mission to civilize the “Oriental East.”6 Their 
first attempt to gain territory from the Ottoman Empire through hostility came 
                                                 
2
 Douglas Dakin, “The Formation of the Greek State, 1821-33,” in The Struggle for Greek 
Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence, edited by 
Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan, 1973), 177. 
3
 Thanos Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 41. 
4
 Sir Ellis Ashmead Bartlett, The Battlefields of Thessaly (London: John Murray, 1897), 23. 
5
 Leften Stavro Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 
468. 
6
 Kostas A. Lavdas, “Reconceptualizing Politics: Concepts of Politics in Modern Greek Political 
Culture,” paper for ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop on ‘The History of Political Concepts: A New 
Perspective on European Political Cultures’ (Copenhagen, 14-19 April 2000), 20. 
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about during the Crimean War. Greek volunteers in Epirus and Thessaly revolted in 
January with support of the Greek government in terms of money and men. It was 
the prompt intervention by France and Britain, through the blockade of the Piraeus, 
which urged King Otho I of Greece to yield and thus prevented a probable 
Ottoman-Greek war.7 
The “national” character of Greek politics was underlined in a new internal 
crisis which continued between 1862 and 1864. At the end of this crisis, Otho was 
overthrown by a military coup, largely because of his failure to pursue the Megale 
Idea, and was replaced by a Danish prince, George I. Despite the fact that the 
Greek state did not have the economic base for an adventurous foreign policy, the 
reign of the new king was also dominated by the theme of expansionism. In 
addition to the island of Crete, where the Christian population revolted several 
times throughout the nineteenth century, Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia were the 
primary loci of Greek interest.  
As happened during the Crimean War, the Greeks did not want to miss the 
opportunity of the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1877. The 
breakdown of Ottoman resistance in Plevne and the Russian occupation of Edirne 
(Adrianople) in the winter of 1877-1878 encouraged the Greeks to march on 
Epirus.8 Especially Theodoros Pangaiou Deligiannis, who was the minister of the 
foreign affairs at that time, believed that the occupation of Thessaly and Epirus 
without declaration of war would bring a considerable bargaining power to Greece 
in the forthcoming peace negotiations. Consequently, the Greek army was ordered 
to cross the Ottoman frontier on 2 February 1878; but the conclusion of armistice 
between the belligerents on the same day foiled the attempt.9 Nevertheless, the 
desire of Britain to counterbalance Russian expansion worked for the Greek aims. 
In accordance with the “balance-of power doctrine,” the increase in the influence of 
                                                 
7
 Winfried Baumgart, The Crimean War 1853-1856 (London: Arnold, 1999), 51-52. 
8
 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1962), 8: 112. 
9
 Tatsios, 51. 
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the Slavic elements in the Balkans had to be offset by making concession to 
Greece.10 Thus, in the Protocol 13 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire was 
required to undertake certain border rectifications in favor of Greece. Although the 
sultan resisted ceding territory to Greece for a considerable time, he was finally 
persuaded by the Powers to give up Thessaly, excluding the town of Alasonya 
(Elassona), and a small portion of Epirus in July 1881. However, the rectification 
of frontier did not satisfy the Greeks, who regarded Thessaly only as a partial gain.  
Throughout the 1880s, a dichotomy with regard to foreign policy persisted 
within the domestic politics of Greece. While Kharilaos Trikoupis, the prime 
minister, tried to calm down the supporters of adventurism and implemented a 
cautious policy which placed primary importance on domestic reform and 
reconstruction, his political rival, Deligiannis, advocated irredentism in the most 
ardent way.11 The escalation of tension in the Balkans increased the popular 
support to the latter and, accordingly, the National Party of Deligiannis won the 
elections in 1885. The territorial enlargement of Bulgaria through the annexation of 
Eastern Rumelia the same year induced the new government to take immediate 
action. The Greek army was mobilized with the aim of invading Epirus and 
Southern Macedonia.12 Greek irregulars attempted to cross the frontier in February 
1886, but they were shortly driven away by Ottoman troops. Having settled the 
recent Eastern Rumelian Crisis, the Great Powers were not willing to face new 
trouble in the Balkans. Thus, once more they undertook the task of preventing an 
Ottoman-Greek war. Fleets of the Powers, excluding France, blockaded Greek 
                                                 
10
 René Albrecht-Carrié, The Concert of Europe 1815-1914 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), 
290. 
11
 S. Victor Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1977), 
10-11. 
12
 The Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia had convinced the Greeks that obtaining the 
connivance and encouragement of at least one of the Powers would yield a similar result for them: 
E. J. Dillon, “The Fate of Greece,” in Contemporary Review 72 (July-December 1897), 4. 
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ports in May 1886 and the Greek government was forced to resign. Trikoupis, 
forming the new cabinet, accepted demobilization.13  
Yet this setback did not give an end to nationalist overtones in Greece, and 
the political rivalry between Trikoupis and Deligiannis continued. The latter 
became the premier again in 1890, owing to the tense political atmosphere created 
by uprisings in Crete; but his ineffective policy resulted in the return of the former 
to the premiership with the elections in 1892.14 Nevertheless, Deligiannis still 
maintained his popularity and political influence thanks to his artful and populist 
demagoguery advocating a “Greater Greece.”15 The strong opposition led by him 
finally forced Trikoupis to resign in January 1895, and Deligiannis came to power 
once again through a decisive electoral victory that year.  
 
 
2. 2. The Ethnike Hetairia and the Revitalization of Irredentism 
 
The change in Greek government in 1895 signified an increase in nationalist 
tendencies among the public. This increase coincided with the abrupt growth of a 
nationalist organization, which would have an extreme influence over Greek 
politics in a couple of years. This organization, which called itself the Ethnike 
Hetairia (National Society), was established in 1894 by a number of young officers 
for the purpose of “raising the morale of the country and to provide support to the 
subjugated population.”16 The high level of discontent in the Greek army towards 
the Trikoupis government, caused by the decrease in military funds and the 
prevention of officer involvement in politics, increased the popularity of this 
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organization among officers.17 These officers, affected negatively by the slump in 
Greek finances, believed that the territorial enlargement of Greece would be the 
only way of acquiring prosperity.18 This idea led the Ethnike Hetairia to work for 
the unification of Epirus, Macedonia and, to a lesser extent, Crete to Greece.  
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, there was an intensive and 
multi-sided rivalry over the future of the Balkans in which Greece did not seem to 
have a favorable position. Bulgaria had become adjacent to Macedonia after its 
annexation of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgarian committees were operating eagerly 
to lay the groundwork for a future penetration of Bulgaria in that region. The 
Serbians were also uttering their claims over the Slav population of Macedonia. In 
addition, Russia and Austria-Hungary were implicitly competing over the Balkans, 
and none of them was sympathetic to Greek expansion in the region. The agitations 
carried out by consulates of Greece throughout Macedonia19 were no longer 
sufficient to keep the Greeks in the race.  
Under these circumstances, Greek nationalists were extremely concerned 
that the Megale Idea was in danger. Numerous proclamations were published in 
newspapers to arouse the interest of the Greek public and government towards the 
rivalry over Macedonia.20 Seeing that the future of Ottoman control over the region 
was quite uncertain, the Ethnike Hetairia decided to take action without delay. 
Obtaining the sympathy of phil-Hellenes throughout the world, the organization 
collected a considerable amount of money for its cause. The first Olympic Games, 
organized in Athens in April 1896, created a suitable environment for the 
organization to meet numerous Greeks from different parts of the world, 
particularly from the Ottoman Empire, and arrange their plans concerning 
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Macedonia. When the insurrections in Crete, which broke out shortly after the 
Olympic Games, amplified the Greek antagonism against the sultan, the Ethnike 
Hetairia found a suitable atmosphere to commence propaganda for a revolt in 
Southern Macedonia.21 Throughout the summer of 1896, small troops of volunteers 
in the pay of the Ethnike Hetairia crossed into this region and commenced 
agitations.22  
Despite the predominance of irredentist ambitions among the Greek public 
and politicians, Greece was considered by Abdülhamid as a potential ally against 
the Slav element in the Balkans. This is why he had a permanent concern to 
maintain good relations with this state, by tolerating to a certain extent the growth 
of Greek nationalism in the region.23 After the outbreak of the Cretan insurrection 
in 1896, the sultan even had a tendency to bargain sovereignty over Crete with the 
Greeks.24 Yet the raids of Greek irregular bands into Ottoman territory were 
signaling that diplomatic efforts would not be enough to maintain peaceful 
relations between the two states. There was an observable boost of nationalist 
feelings in Greece and it was certain that they would go out of control if the 
attempt of the Ethnike Hetairia in Macedonia yielded the slightest success. The 
sultan reasoned that the raids had to be tackled in the most drastic way so that the 
Greeks would be dissuaded from engaging in further adventures that could threaten 
the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. So, he ordered the troops at the 
Greek frontier to “crush the bands and save the honor of the Ottoman army.”25 
Military reservists from Selânik (Salonika), Kosova (Kosovo) and Manastır 
(Bitola) were also conscripted as reinforcements.26  
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The caution of the Ottomans did not permit the bands of Greek irregulars 
any concrete achievement, but the incursions were narrated in the Athenian press 
with a high level of excitement and exaggeration. The Greek public, thrilled by the 
heroic stories in the newspapers, started to believe that the Megale Idea would 
come true through the endeavors of the Ethnike Hetairia.27 Receiving the support 
of numerous merchants, shopkeepers and other well-to-do civilians,28 the 
organization shortly obtained enormous popularity and influence in Greece.       
The increase of warlike overtones among the Greek society urged the 
Deligiannis government to improve the military power of Greece. Foreign loans 
were spent on armament and a training camp for 12,000 men was opened at Thebes 
in July 1896.29 Under pressure of the Ethnike Hetairia, the opposition and public, 
the government prepared a project of reorganization of the army, which was 
eventually approved by the king. Reservists were called to military service and a 
massive spending on armaments was launched. Due to the lack of financial 
resources, these preparations were carried out through foreign loans, internal 
credits and voluntary subscriptions.30 Nevertheless, the premier still kept his 
hesitance to intervene in the crisis due to the poor condition of the Greek army and 
navy.  
The attitude of Deligiannis was harshly criticized by both the opposition 
and the Ethnike Hetairia, which desired a pro-active policy for the sake of the 
Megale Idea. Especially the latter, assuming the leadership in pursuit of this cause, 
started to act more audaciously than before. Through long manifestos published in 
newspapers, the Ethnike Hetairia called the Greek nation to force their king and 
government to “undertake their responsibilities.”31 In December 1896, the Ottoman 
consul in Iasi (Yaş) reported that the organization had purchased 20,000 Gras rifles 
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from Belgium to arm the Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire. He also conveyed 
rumors that the committee was planning to incite a revolt in Ottoman lands in the 
following spring through contribution of armed bands as well as Ottoman Greeks.32 
The Ottoman consuls in the Greek towns of Trikkala (Tırhala), Larissa (Yenişehir) 
and Volo (Golos) warned the Ottoman minister in Athens that Greek secret 
committees were collecting money to purchase arms and outfits for brigands, while 
a massive number of Greek regular forces were being transferred to the Ottoman 
frontier.33 When Asım Bey, the Ottoman minister in Athens, asked Deligiannis 
about these reports, the premier replied that he had no information on such 
developments.34  
The increase of irredentist and warlike sentiments in Greece in the 1890s 
and the strengthening of the Ethnike Hetairia were simultaneous developments that 
fostered each other. The preparations by the Ethnike Hetairia, which were 
encouraged by the nationalistic impulse existing within the populace, amplified the 
public excitement even further. This vicious circle created an irreversible popular 
trend directed towards war. The government’s power and ability to control the 
proceedings were reduced severely by the prevailing ambitions among the Greek 
society. Only a small spark would be enough to transform this emotional 
accumulation into a daring movement. This spark arose from Crete before too long.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE CRETAN CRISIS 
 
 
 
The Cretan Crisis was not the direct cause of the Ottoman-Greek War of 
1897, as the war was a consequence of the abiding and ever-growing irredentist 
aspirations in Greece. But by creating the momentum for military and national 
mobilization in Greece, the crisis in Crete was the main catalyst of the war.  
 
 
3. 1. Cretan Insurrections throughout the Nineteenth Century 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, Muslim and Christian inhabitants of 
Crete lived in a state of perpetual quarrel, which had turned out to be a sort of 
vendetta rather than a conflict due to religious fanaticism.1 These quarrels owed 
much to the never-ending aspiration among the Cretan Christians for the union of 
the island with Greece.2 Two major insurrections, in 1841 and 1866, were initiated 
by them with this aim, causing large casualties on both sides and increasing the 
awareness of Europe in the matters of Crete. Fearing that the Great Powers could 
intervene in the Cretan question on the side of the Christian Cretans, the Sublime 
Porte undertook certain reforms on the island in 1868. Ten years later, the 
supporters of union attempted to take advantage of the war between Russia and the 
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Ottoman Empire by instigating another insurrection. The Greek government also 
requested the Great Powers to authorize union, by pointing out the high level of 
discontent among the Christian inhabitants of the island. Refusing the detachment 
of Crete from Ottoman sovereignty, the Powers advised the Sublime Porte, 
articulated in Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, to execute the reforms of 1868 
with appropriate modifications in favor of the Christians.3 Upon this provision, the 
Ottoman government concluded a convention with the Christian rebels in Halepa 
on 23 October 1878.  
The Halepa Convention was able to pacify the island for some time, yet, in 
fact, the embers in Crete kept smoldering. The annexation of Eastern Rumelia by 
Bulgaria encouraged the Christian Cretans to rise up again. The insurrection started 
in 1888. In order to restore order, the sultan reversed certain provisions of the 
Halepa Convention and sent a Muslim military commander to the island. This 
action was protested by the Christian Cretans as well as the Great Powers.4 The 
extremist elements among the Christians founded a committee called Epitropi in 
September 1894. This committee shortly became a powerful revolutionary 
organization devoted to liberating the island from Ottoman “yoke.” The 
replacement of Alexander Karateodori Paşa, the Christian governor of Crete, by a 
Muslim, Turhan Paşa, on 8 March 1896 totally infuriated the Christians in the 
island. A large-scale insurgence broke out shortly after the new governor’s 
declaration that he would not allow the Cretan Assembly to convene unless the 
Epitropi was disbanded. The Ottoman fort at Vamos was besieged by the Christian 
insurgents in May.5 Volunteers from Greece began to flow to the island.  
Even though the Greek government seemed to be against armed 
insurrection of the Christian Cretans, the public in Greece was extremely sensitive 
towards the matters of Crete. This was mainly because of the nationalistic 
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propaganda carried out by the Ethnike Hetairia.6 The excitement among the Greek 
populace was weakening the control of the king and government over the 
proceedings. When King George was requested by the Great Powers to stop Greek 
support to the Cretan insurgence, he replied that he was unable to retain the 
volunteers from departing for Crete, as Greece in its entirety would rise up then in 
the name of the Megale Idea.7  
Realizing that the efforts of Great Powers would not be able to pacify the 
island, the Ottoman sultan and government resorted to self-help and dispatched 16 
battalions of troops to Crete to restore order.8 The Great Powers were against any 
kind of disturbance in the Near East that would upset the general peace and 
stability in the region. Thus, when the Cretan insurrection turned out to be a Greek 
separatist movement, they began to send naval forces to the Cretan waters in order 
to prevent a direct confrontation between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Greek 
and Ottoman governments were respectively advised by the Powers to stop the 
ongoing support to the Cretan insurgence and to undertake certain administrative 
reforms in the island.9 In order to expedite the reforms, the ambassadors of the 
Great Powers in İstanbul prepared a program, which was quite in harmony with the 
demands of Christian deputies in the Cretan Assembly.10 The sultan, under pressure 
of the Powers, formally promised on 27 August 1896 to execute this program. An 
arrangement for the administration of the island was promulgated on 10 September 
and a Christian, Georgi Paşa Berovich, was appointed as the governor of Crete for 
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a period of five years with extensive authority.11 The Powers undertook the task of 
establishing a new judicial system and gendarmerie in Crete.  
 
 
3. 2. The Cretan Insurrection of 1897 
 
No matter how decisively the reform process was put into effect by the 
Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, it was soon realized that it would not easily 
bring the troubles in the island to an end. The Epitropi, encouraged and supported 
by the Ethnike Hetairia, could not be satisfied with any other solution than the 
unification of Crete with Greece. Many Christian deputies in the Cretan Assembly 
also possessed such an ulterior desire.12 According to the supporters of union, 
execution of reforms under the auspices of the Great Powers was reinforcing the 
Ottoman sovereignty over the island and could thwart their goals for a long time to 
come.13 On the other hand, the Muslim inhabitants of the island started to worry 
that they would eventually be deprived of certain rights that they actually 
possessed.14 Therefore, both parties attempted to disrupt the reform process. 
Ottoman authorities also delayed the enforcement of reforms in order not to offend 
the Muslim Cretans.15 But these procrastinations reduced the level of distrust 
among the Christian Cretans towards the existing administration. Gennadis, the 
Greek consul-general in Crete, was encouraging the extremist elements among 
Christians with the active support of the opposition leaders in Greece.16 
Transportation of arms, munitions and volunteers from Greece to the island 
continued. Finally, in late-January 1897, armed conflicts broke out again.   
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At the outbreak of disturbances, the king and government in Greece 
portrayed a somewhat neutral attitude and expressed their willingness that 
tranquility should be preserved in Crete.17 On 5 February, Deligiannis declared in 
the Greek parliament that “at a moment when the Powers are working for the re-
establishment of the operation of the institutions which have been granted to Crete, 
Greece has no interest, nor was she in duty bound to interfere, and to present 
herself as wanting the union of Crete with Greece.”18 Whether the premier was 
sincere in this statement is difficult to know, but an ominous telegram received 
from Hanya (Canea) on the very same day led him to make a decision which 
contradicted his speech. This telegram, sent by Gennadis, announced with 
exaggeration that the Christian Cretans were on the verge of annihilation: “The 
Turkish soldiers have given the signal for massacre by shooting from the ramparts 
into the town. I have asked the consuls to debark marines to save what is possible; 
the consuls have refused. No hope. The Christians of the town will all be 
massacred.”19  
The Greek government could not remain inactive upon these news, which 
caused great uneasiness in Athens. Two warships of the Greek navy were 
dispatched to the island immediately.20 Alexandros Skouzes, the Greek minister of 
foreign affairs, informed the Great Powers that sending of these vessels was for the 
sole purpose of “succoring the suffering,”21 but this action was most likely intended 
to test the standpoint of the Great Powers in the crisis. Although it was generally 
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known that they desired to maintain the general peace and would not easily tolerate 
an audacious attempt by Greece, the Powers had a general idea that the 
misgovernment of the sultan was the primary cause of the troubles in Crete. 
Furthermore, any support by the Greeks to their Christian “brethren” in Crete 
would doubtlessly be praised and supported by the European public opinion. Under 
these circumstances, how the Powers would react to the involvement of Greece in 
the Cretan crisis was somewhat uncertain.  
The dispatch of Greek warships to the Cretan waters was protested by the 
Great Powers as, on the one hand, increasing the excitement among the Greek 
public, and, on the other hand, inducing the Ottoman government to take counter-
measures.22 But the opposition of the Powers did not go further and neither their 
representatives in Athens, nor their consuls in Crete made an effective effort for the 
withdrawal of the dispatched vessels. The apparent indifference of the Great 
Powers encouraged the Greek government to send further naval units, carrying 
volunteers, weapons and munitions, to the island.23 Protestations by the Ottoman 
government were evaded with the allegation that the vessels were being sent only 
for humanitarian purposes.24  
Yet neither the public in Greece nor the Cretan Christians were satisfied 
with the steps taken by the Greek government. The public, already agitated by the 
telegram of Gennadis, became totally infuriated by fabricated reports and stories 
published in newspapers.25 Hostile demonstrations against the Ottoman Empire 
were organized in Athens and the provinces.26 Encouraged by the warlike 
atmosphere in Greece, the Ethnike Hetairia published a long and excessively 
fervent proclamation, calling their “Cretan brethren” to fight for the union of Crete 
with their “Hellenic motherland.”27 Cretan insurgents responded to this invitation 
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positively by hoisting the Greek flag, declaring union with Greece and appealing to 
King George to take possession of the island.28     
The proceedings were developing quite rapidly and neither the Ottoman 
Empire nor the Great Powers was able to respond on time. Although the Ottomans 
were alarmed at the intelligence coming from Greece and Crete, they did not want 
to take unilateral action while the reforms in the island were still being carried out. 
Instead, the Sublime Porte requested on 8 February from the Great Powers to 
“either urge the Greek government to withdraw their navy from Crete, or let the 
Imperial government undertake the measures necessitated by the incidents.”29 What 
the Powers did in response was to repeat their advice of peace to the Greek 
government and authorize their admirals in the Cretan waters to prevent an 
aggressive action by Greek vessels.30 Although none of them was willing to take 
the initiative, the Powers were anxious to avert a Greek attempt to annex Crete, as 
it was almost certain that such an annexation would pave the way for 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and generate the danger of a general war in 
Europe.31 
  
 
3. 3. The Greek Decision of Intervention 
 
Facing on the one hand the warnings by Europe to respect peace, and the 
internal pressure for aggression on the other, the Greek government found itself in 
a difficult position. Since the government was not completely decided on the policy 
it should follow, its declarations and actions oscillated between these two 
alternatives for some time. On 10 February, when a number of Greek vessels, 
including armed torpedo boats, were still in the Cretan waters, Deligiannis was still 
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trying to calm down the supporters of war with a long speech he gave in the Greek 
parliament:  
... The entire Greek population throughout the world also desires that 
Crete should be united to Greece. But, in fact, this desire contradicts with 
the international law; since none of the treaties of 1830, 1856 and 1878 
has placed the island under the sovereignty of the king of Greece… Thus, 
we have to be careful about not being pushed by our dreams, which have 
deviated from reality, and prefer a moderate policy towards Crete…We 
are aware that the Muslims of the island have been working to annihilate 
the Christian population there… But the Cretan question is persisting and 
it will surely have different dimensions in the future. I can assure you that 
in any case the government will not hesitate to undertake its 
responsibilities; and, if required, it will act in the boldest way possible… 
Therefore, I advise you to be patient and criticize our government if our 
policy proves wrong in the end.32 
No matter how these words were intended as a response to criticisms by the 
opposition towards the apparent lethargy of the Greek government, the speech of 
Deligiannis in fact gave the signals of a prospective enterprise for the annexation of 
Crete. After some time of testing the resoluteness of the Great Powers for peace, 
and the Greek public, the Ethnike Hetairia and the opposition for aggression, the 
premier had finally realized that it was almost impossible for him to resist the 
overwhelming pressure coming from the latter. The opposition, led by Dimitrios 
Rallis, had long been blaming the government and the king for missing the 
opportunity to occupy Crete during the conflicts in 1896.33 The mob, stimulated by 
the warlike propagandas of the Ethnike Hetairia, had become the actual ruling 
power at Athens.34 The positions of the king and the government would be in 
danger if the crisis in Crete was concluded without any material gain for Greece. 
Alternatively, while opposing demands of the public was extremely difficult, the 
Great Powers could possibly be brought to terms, as their dread of a general war 
might induce them to concede the Greek claims.35 In this respect, defying the 
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Powers and the Ottoman Empire instead of its public seemed to be the most 
preferable strategy to the Greek government.  
Under these circumstances, the rumors that the Sublime Porte was preparing 
reinforcements to be used in Crete impelled the Greek government to act hastily. 
The Ottoman government had withdrawn a substantial portion of its forces from 
the island when the reforms began to be carried out,36 and the circumstances at that 
moment were optimal for an audacious move on Crete. Arrival of new Ottoman 
troops could make such a move totally unfeasible. Thus, on 10 February, the same 
day that Deligiannis gave his speech in the parliament, a fleet under the command 
of Prince George was sent to Crete.37 On the following day, Skouzes formally 
declared to the Great Powers that Greece could no longer remain passive to the 
proceedings and Crete should be liberated from Ottoman sovereignty.38 He also did 
not hesitate to tell Count Szechenyi, the Austro-Hungarian chargé d’affaires in 
Athens, that “Greece would sooner raise a general conflagration by means of her 
large communities at Constantinople and all over the East than yield in the matter 
of Crete.”39 On 13 February, the Greek iron-clad Miaoulis opened fire on an 
Ottoman steam-yacht Fuad and increased the tension in the Cretan waters even 
further.40  
The final and most striking move of the Greek government came about on 
the same day. A military force of approximately 1,400 soldiers,41 under the 
command of Colonel Timoleon Vassos, was sent to Crete with the following 
instructions: 
… Landing with the troops under your command on Crete and in a proper 
locality, you will, in the name of the King of the Hellenes, George I, 
occupy the island, driving away the Turks from the forts, and taking 
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possession of them. Every action that you will take you will base upon 
the established Hellenic laws in the name of the King and under the 
responsibility of the Hellenic Government. As soon as you land you will 
issue a Proclamation concerning the occupation.42  
The dispatch of Greek troops in Crete internationalized the Cretan crisis, 
which had initially been a local problem within the Ottoman Empire. By attempting 
to occupy a foreign territory without declaration of war, Greece was not only 
breaching international law, but also threatening stability in the Near East and 
Balkans. Therefore, the representatives of the Great Powers in Athens immediately 
presented to the Greek government a memorandum, declaring that “in the event of 
its being true that the regular troops are under orders to effect an armed landing on 
a point of the Ottoman Empire, we consider it our duty…to dwell upon the 
disapprobation which such a proceeding will meet with from all our 
Governments…”43 The memorandum was answered on the same day by the Greek 
foreign minister that the Greek government, which could no longer endure the 
lamentable condition of the Cretans, as it was bound to them by “sacred ties and 
religion,” decided to occupy the island and restore peace and order there.44 Prince 
George tried to justify the decision of the Greek government by claiming that the 
Cretan insurgents would not surrender their arms to the Great Powers or to Turkey, 
but to Greece alone.45 Deligiannis explained this incident to Asım Bey by alleging 
that his government was forced to send troops to Crete by the pressure of public 
opinion and the dispatched ships were only charged to sail round the island.46 
However, in the Greek parliament, he did not hesitate to declare that since Crete 
was henceforth a part of Greece, a draft of law for the island would shortly be 
prepared.47 
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While dispatching naval and military forces to Crete, the Greek government 
also set about to summon classes of reservists to the colors to be sent into 
Thessaly.48 This might be a defensive measure commenced with the anticipation 
that the Ottomans could declare war on Greece after the occupation of Crete. But 
the Greek nationalists believed that it was the right time to take the offensive 
against the Ottoman Empire. A secret society in Athens, which called itself “the 
Bloody Committee,” was inciting the Greeks, living both inside and outside 
Greece, to unite for war by delivering the following proclamation:  
The time for salvaging the honor of the Greeks, who have been 
overwhelmed with wickedness, has come. The nation must shake off the 
innumerable disgraces, to which they have been subjected for a long 
time, and rise up. Let us rise up altogether. Let us get ready to fulfill 
every kind of sacrifice. Let us decide on freeing our nation from the 
stains of evil and disgrace with the blood-floods of an honorable 
war…The king, the prime minister, the leader of opposition, ministers, 
members of the parliament and owners of wealth: Unite for this 
movement as it will direct you to fame and honor…War, war again, and 
war forever!49 
Through its agencies across Europe, the Ethnike Hetairia had already been carrying 
on propaganda and collecting money for its cause. Some European press was 
subsidized for writing fabricated stories about atrocities suffered by the Christians 
in Crete.50 The members of the Ethnike Hetairia expected that in case of war 
between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, a large mass of volunteers would come 
from Europe and fight alongside the Greek army.51 They also hoped to inflame a 
large-scale conflagration within the Ottoman lands, by provoking the Christians 
living in Epirus, Macedonia, Albania, and even in İstanbul, and thus to turn the 
European public opinion against the Ottoman Empire once more.52  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE ROAD TO WAR 
 
 
 
4. 1. The First Reactions to the Greek Occupation of Crete 
 
 
4. 1. 1. The Ottoman Empire 
 
The latest incidents were certainly enough to be declared casus belli by the 
Ottoman Empire. But, fearing the possible repercussions of a direct military 
confrontation, particularly in Balkan affairs, the Ottomans decided not to sever 
diplomatic relations with Greece at once, but to expect a solution through the 
channel of Europe.1 Accordingly, the Sublime Porte immediately requested the 
Great Powers to “intervene in the most energetic manner, and, if necessary, by 
coercive measures,” or at least allow the Ottomans apply appropriate measures for 
the resolution of the incidents.2 On 14 February, Tevfik Paşa, the Ottoman minister 
of foreign affairs, met Alexander Nelidov and Sir Philip Currie, the Russian and 
British ambassadors in İstanbul, and discussed rumors that the Greek government 
was planning to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. The ambassadors eased the 
minister’s concerns by indicating that Prince George and his troops had not landed 
on the island yet, and the Great Powers would never allow a massive Greek 
                                                 
1
 Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 361-362. 
2
 BOA, Y.A.RES., 85/20; Turkey No. 11, No. 78. 
 28 
military force to land in Crete. Yet the Russian ambassador still advised him to be 
cautious about an attempt by Greek irregulars to infiltrate the Thessalian border.3   
Nevertheless, the situation was too grave for the Ottomans to be completely 
entrusted to the good offices of the Great Powers. Especially the possibility of a 
Greek uprising in Epirus and Macedonia induced the Ottoman government to take 
military measures. To what extent the advice of Nelidov was influential is difficult 
to determine; but on the very same day with the abovementioned meeting, the 
sultan issued an imperial decree which formed an army of 140 battalions, 27 
squadrons and 36 artillery batteries, and attached to this force the fortification and 
pontooning companies at Üsküb (Skopje) as well as the telegram company and the 
transportation battalion at Manastır. The regular troops (nizamiyye) of this army 
would depart immediately to Yanya (Janina) and Alasonya, which were 
respectively on the Epirote and Thessalian side of the Greek frontier, while the 
reservists (redif) would be sent to these locations following conscription.4  
The mobilized forces constituted roughly one-fourth of the whole Ottoman 
army. In spite of the precarious political and financial situation of the empire, 
caused by the recent Armenian uprisings, the Ottoman government did not hesitate 
to undertake such an onerous activity. In his book, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz 
did not conceal his surprise about the success of the campaign by indicating that 
the mobilization of the Ottoman army was fulfilled by an amount of money which 
was equal to the daily expenses of the German army in expedition.5  
The Sublime Porte tried to justify the mobilization of the Ottoman army by 
declaring that “the presence of raw levies and bands of brigands in Thessaly 
necessitated precautionary measures of a defensive character.”6 Although the Great 
Powers kept requesting insistently from the Porte not to dispatch additional troops 
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to Crete,7 the military preparations on the Greek border did not cause any 
resistance in Europe. Foreign ministers of the Powers later responded that these 
preparations were a rightful activity of self-defense and would not be objected 
unless the Ottomans executed a preemptive attack.8  
 
 
4. 1. 2. The Great Powers 
 
News that the Greek government was sending land forces to Crete alarmed 
the European cabinets. In spite of the sympathy of the Christian public opinion, as 
well as Queen Victoria of Britain and Czar Nicholas II of Russia, who had kinship 
with the dynasty in Greece, to the Greek cause, the governments in Europe were 
exceedingly careful to avert a new international crisis.9  
In Britain, although the queen, the opposition and the public had phil-
Hellenic tendencies, the British cabinet did not regard supporting Greece in its 
attempt as a prudent policy. This is because, some of the Great Powers clearly 
condemned the Greek enterprise over Crete and it was clear that they could not be 
easily convinced to intervene in the crisis in favor of Greece. Under these 
circumstances, an isolated support by Britain to the insurgence in Crete would be to 
quarrel with the other Great Powers, which would disturb the European Concert.10 
Moreover, if the hostility of the Greeks were rewarded by Europe, that would 
surely encourage the other Christian elements in the Balkans to obtain similar 
concessions through aggression. Such a situation, creating new disputes between 
the Powers, could lead to serious complications in Europe, possibly to a general 
war. With these calculations, Salisbury declared the Greek expedition to Crete as 
“a most ill-advised act” and preserved the intention to resolve the crisis in 
agreement with the other Powers.11 The first reactions of Gabriel Hanotaux and 
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Emilio Visconti-Venosta, the foreign ministers of France and Italy respectively, to 
the incident also advocated collective action by the Powers to prevent an Ottoman-
Greek war.12  
A military conflict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was not 
desirable for Austria-Hungary and Russia as they feared that the war could provoke 
the other states in the Balkans and create serious complications there. Although 
both of these Powers had long regarded the Balkans as a potential area of 
enlargement, neither was disposed to actively engage in the affairs of the region at 
that time due to several reasons. Austria-Hungary was suffering acute internal 
difficulties which hardly allowed any international adventurism.13 Especially the 
recent refusal of the British government to renew the Mediterranean Agreements, 
which had somewhat worked as a guarantee for the territorial integrity of Austria-
Hungary since 1887, made the Austrians anxious to preserve the balances in the 
Near East and Balkans. The Russians, on the other hand, were concerned primarily 
with the problems of East Asia, so they were as eager as the Austrians to maintain 
stability in the Near East and Balkans, at least for a certain period of time.14  
The strongest opposition to the dispatch of Greek troops to Crete came from 
Germany. In Berlin, Emperor Wilhelm II reacted to the news by expressing that 
“the reply to this should be the dispatch of cannons to the Piraeus.” He believed 
that the foolhardiness of Greece, which could precipitate fresh troubles in Greece, 
Macedonia, Eastern Anatolia as well as İstanbul, had to be punished by the Powers. 
Europe should not, according to him, allow the landing of Greek forces on the 
island while persistently impeding the dispatch of reinforcements by the Ottoman 
government.15 The emperor addressed to Frank C. Lascelles, the British 
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ambassador in Berlin, a proposal to blockade the Piraeus as early as 14 February.16 
Although the attitude of the German government did not match the outburst of the 
emperor at the beginning,17 the idea of an international blockade of the Piraeus 
soon became the central element of German policy concerning the crisis between 
Greece and the Ottoman Empire.  
Friedrich von Holstein, an influential statesman in the German Foreign 
Office, had long believed that Britain would prefer to see a continental war in 
Europe, which would secure its presence in Africa and Asia. Therefore he strongly 
endeavored to promote the desires of Russia and Austria-Hungary for preserving 
the status-quo by gaining the support of Italy and, if possible, France. Although the 
existing crisis between Greece and the Ottoman Empire seemed to be a local one, it 
had to be contained before growing into a war which could stimulate rivalries 
among the Great Powers. With these considerations, the German government 
assured the Russian government that any Russian proposal designed to maintain 
peace would be supported by Germany and recommended to Austrian and Italian 
cabinets, for their approval, as well.18 In response to this offer, the Russians 
prepared a project of landing detachments from various European ships in Crete 
and holding the island en depôt (i.e. in trust) until the Powers would agree on a 
permanent solution of the Cretan question.19 This project, agreed upon by the other 
Great Powers, was conveyed to the Sublime Porte and the admirals of the Powers 
in the Cretan waters. In İstanbul, a special commission of ministers (Encümen-i 
Mahsus-i Vükelâ) immediately issued the permission that a certain number of 
soldiers that belonged to the naval forces of the Great Powers could be 
disembarked on Crete.20 On 15 February, 450 marines (100 each from the British, 
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French, Russian and Italian ships and 50 from Austria-Hungary) were landed in 
Hanya.21 Assuming the temporary protection of the town, the admirals declared to 
the local government and leaders of the rebels that: 
After summoning in the SS Sicily, under the presidency of Vice Admiral 
Canevaro, the admirals and captains of the European naval forces decided 
to put Crete under the control of the Great Powers by landing marines on 
every city in the island. This decision will be communicated to the 
command of the Greek fleet and the commander will be invited to abstain 
from any military action on the island. The marines will defend the island 
in case of attack or harassment. Greek troops will be arrested 
immediately if they are found in the island. The Great Powers announce 
that appropriate measures will be taken for the benefit of the both 
communities living in the island and declare that it is necessary for 
everyone to leave the arms in order to gain the goodwill of Europe.22 
On the same day, another declaration was made in Crete; but this one was 
addressed to the whole Cretan community. Upon landing with his troops near 
Hanya, Colonel Vassos issued the following proclamation, which had been 
delivered to him by the Greek government:  
…This lamentable condition of a people of the same race and religion, 
who have the same destiny and history as ourselves, could no longer be 
tolerated. His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, my august Master, 
decided to put an end to this state of things by the military occupation of 
the island…Without distinction of religion or nationality, I promise, in 
the name of His Majesty, that I will protect the honor, life and property of 
the inhabitants, respect their religious convictions, and bring them peace 
and equal justice.23 
 
 
4. 2. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 1 
 
The Greek government having landed in Crete an operating force, and the 
admirals having put the island under their control, a double duty was imposed on 
Europe on avoiding mutual aggression between the Christian and Muslim Cretans, 
and preventing a conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Greece.24 Germany still 
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insisted that Wilhelm’s project of blockading Greek ports would be the best 
remedy for both complications. Contrary to the general supposition, neither love of 
the Ottomans, nor despise towards the Greeks was a motivation for the Germans. 
The project of blockade was actually designed to prevent an action by not only the 
Greek but also the Ottoman side. On 17 February, Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-
Schillingsfürst, the German chancellor, articulated the rationale of the project to the 
Powers as follows:  
For the purpose of depriving the Greek Government of the conviction -
which is the foundation of its actions- that, in case of need, it can rely on 
the support of certain of the Powers, and, on the other hand, of removing 
the alternative -either that the Turkish Government accepts the challenge 
to fight, or that Mussulman fanaticism seizes the opportunity for a rising 
with incalculable results- the individual measures…are insufficient. If the 
Powers seriously desire to avoid an outbreak, they will be forced in their 
joint action to strike harder and closer to the center of the Greek 
movement…25  
The German proposal was supported by the Russian government, which 
strongly denounced the presence of an armed Greek force in Crete. Mikhail 
Nikolayevich Muravyov, the foreign minister of Russia, regarded the action by the 
Greek government almost as a declaration of war to the Great Powers.26 Thus, he 
informed the German government that Russia was ready to participate in an 
energetic measure to be carried out collectively by the fleets of the Powers against 
Greece.27 Austria-Hungary was also sympathetic to the blockade of the Piraeus.  
But the opinions of these three governments were not enough for a 
collective action by the Powers, especially when the British government was not 
willing to make such a commitment. First of all, when the British cabinet had 
prevented him, in 1885, from implementing a pro-active policy upon the Sublime 
Porte concerning the Armenian matters, Salisbury had decided to place secondary 
importance to the ‘Eastern Question.’28 But, thanks to the Cretan crisis, Britain had 
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been dragged once more into a dispute between the sultan and his Christian 
subjects. The mise en dépôt of Crete was not an insignificant commitment, and the 
British government wanted to see some result from that before proceeding to a new 
one. Besides, participation of Britain in a coercive measure against Greece would 
be perceived as an open support to the sultan, who was constantly being blamed by 
the opposition and the public in Britain as the responsible party for the sufferings 
of the Christian Cretans. Thus, no matter that he did not approve the daring attempt 
of Greece, Salisbury endeavored to appease the Greeks without offending them, as 
well as the British public opinion. The best way to achieve this would be 
accelerating the process of establishing autonomy in Crete. While the blockade of 
their ports could exasperate the Greeks and drive them to advance into 
Macedonia;29 decreasing Ottoman authority over Crete would, according to him, 
pleasantly induce them to end their campaign in the island.30 Therefore, on 17 
February, Salisbury responded to the German proposal of blockade with another 
proposal of restructuring the administration of Crete: “It is not possible usefully to 
consider [the proposal] until the Powers have resolved upon a course of action as 
regards the island of Crete, which is now occupied by them…A strong feeling is 
entertained by Her Majesty’s Government that… [Crete] must be converted into a 
privileged province of the Empire.”31 According to him, the governor-general of 
Crete should be appointed by the Great Powers and he should enjoy considerable 
liberty in his decisions. Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador in London, wrote 
to his government that Salisbury imagined “a future position for Crete, similar to 
that of Bulgaria.”32  
While King George and the Greek Government were repeatedly assuring 
the representatives of the Powers that Greece would act strictly on the defensive on 
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the Thessalian border,33 the Greeks kept taking further steps towards annexation of 
Crete. Vassos had already ordered his troops, augmented by a massive number of 
Cretan insurgents, to occupy the interior of the island, by ignoring all the efforts by 
the admirals on the ground that he could not take orders from anybody except his 
government.34 On 19 February, Gennadis hoisted a Greek flag at the Greek 
consulate in Hanya. The commander of the foreign detachments immediately 
protested this action and requested him to haul down the flag.35 On the following 
day, a bill was introduced by Skouzes to the Greek parliament for the abolition of 
the Greek consulates at Hanya, Kandiye (Candia) and Resmo (Rethymo), which 
was incompatible with the new state of affairs that occurred by the Greek 
occupation of Crete.36 On the grounds that Crete had ceased to be Ottoman 
territory, Gennadis would thence be the royal commissioner of Greece in the 
island.37 This defiance produced a strong reaction from the Powers, inducing them 
to undertake more effective measures.38 The German government, in particular, 
exasperated by the effrontery of the Greeks decided to follow a two-sided strategy. 
While pushing for the blockade of the Piraeus in European diplomatic circles, 
Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, the German foreign minister, advised the 
Ottomans to hasten military preparations that would enable their forces to cross the 
Thessalian border if and when necessary. Even if an armed conflict never took 
place, he continued, these military preparations and the presence of a large 
Ottoman army nearby the border could be advantageous for the Ottomans in 
negotiations on Crete.39  
Despite the admirals’ unanimous resolution to defeat the insurgents, their 
forces were only able to protect the large coastal towns. According to them, the 
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crisis could not be resolved unless Greece was persuaded to withdraw its forces 
from Crete.40 Yet the lack of consensus among the Powers concerning the measure 
to be applied on Greece hindered a collective European action. The Germans, 
supported by the Austrians and the Russians, insisted on the blockade of Greek 
ports while the British were completely against that. France and Italy were 
somewhat reserved, owing much to the phil-Hellene tendencies within their public. 
The French government, while being disinclined to support the German idea of 
blockade, was still disposed to contribute a collective effort to end the crisis. This 
is because, if prolonged, the crisis could cause more serious complications and 
France was not ready yet to engage in a major conflict.41 The Italians, on the other 
hand, were acting on the principle that they would participate in a measure only if 
it was agreed unanimously by the other five Powers.42  
When it became clear that neither Germany nor Britain would relinquish 
their stiff postures concerning the Cretan affairs, the Russian government assumed 
mediation among them. With a telegram, dated 23 February, Muravyov proposed 
to the Great Powers two basic principles on which the European policy concerning 
Crete to be based henceforth:  
1. Crete shall in no case be annexed to Greece under present 
circumstances.  
2. As Turkey has delayed the application of the reforms agreed upon, 
they no longer meet the requirements of the present situation. The Powers 
have resolved, while maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to 
bestow on Crete an autonomous administration.  
According to the proposal, these two points would be communicated to the 
Ottoman and Greek governments, and the latter would also be demanded to 
withdraw its troops and ships from Crete within three or four days. If this demand 
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was not complied with, the Powers would “proceed immediately to measures of 
extreme rigor.”43  
The two articles and the later provisions in the Russian proposal were 
evidently designed to satisfy the demands of Britain and Germany, respectively. 
The Germans did not raise an objection to the project, possibly owing to the advice 
of Count Agenor Goluchowski, the foreign minister of Austria-Hungary, to accept 
a compromise.44 But, on the following day, the British government responded to 
the Russian initiative with an alternative project based on four points. The first 
three, i.e. autonomy, Ottoman sovereignty, and communication of the resolution to 
the two parties, overlapped with the Russian proposal. The last point was, however, 
different as it required the withdrawal of not only Greek, but also Ottoman forces 
from Crete: “If either Turkey or Greece persistently refuse, when required, to 
withdraw their naval and military forces from the island, the Powers should impose 
their decision by force upon the State so refusing.”45 The British government still 
kept its caution not to portray an explicit reaction to the Greek expedition to Crete. 
According to Salisbury, sending an ultimatum only to Greece, as proposed by 
Russia, would create an impression that Britain was willing to restore Ottoman 
forces as the masters of Crete.46 But, the Liberal Unionists in the British cabinet, 
led by Joseph Chamberlain, a fervent phil-Hellene,47 would never accept any 
solution less than the complete autonomy of Crete.48  
 The British counter-proposal was evaluated and responded to by the other 
Powers in a short period of time. All of them raised objections to Point 4 except 
Italy, which totally agreed with Britain.49 Hanotaux was also not completely 
against the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Crete; but, pointing out the 
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vulnerability of Muslim Cretans, he stated that this should be done after the local 
gendarmerie in the island was organized by the Powers.50 The German and 
Austrian foreign ministers were of the opinion that if the island was to remain 
under suzerainty of the sultan, Ottoman forces had the right to be in the island 
while the Greek ones did not.51 Muravyov did not express any opinion on whether 
the Ottoman forces should stay in Crete or not; but indicated that such a proposal 
would cause delay in the negotiations.52  
 
 
4. 3. Reflections of the Crisis in the Balkan Politics 
 
The negotiations between the Powers went on approximately for a week. In 
the meantime, Deligiannis, fearing a unanimous decision of blockade, brazenly 
declared that unity existed between the interests of Greece and the Ottoman 
Empire, so the problem should be resolved directly between the two states. While 
making absolutely no impact on the negotiations held in Europe, this statement 
raised hopes in İstanbul for a pacific settlement of the Cretan question. The 
Ottoman minister in Athens was instructed immediately to meet Deligiannis and to 
communicate to him that the Sublime Porte was ready to halt the military 
preparations as long as the Greek government recalled its forces from Crete. But 
the minister was not able to obtain a clear answer from the Greek government.53 
His reports back to the Porte rather pointed out that big demonstrations about the 
Cretan question were being organized in Athens and the level of excitement in the 
city was extremely high.54 Meanwhile, Ottoman consuls in Trikkala, Larissa and 
Volo were reporting that Muslims who lived in Thessaly were subjected to offenses 
and a mass emigration to the Ottoman Empire from the region was to be expected. 
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In consequence, Tevfik Paşa sent for the Greek ambassador and asked the 
termination of hostile practices in Greece.55 
 Actually, the real anxiety of the Ottomans was not a military confrontation 
with the Greeks, as their armed forces were incomparably superior, in terms of both 
quality and quantity, to the Greek army, but a possible inclusion of the other 
Balkan states in the conflict. At that time, it was generally believed that the 
Macedonian question would soon break out in an acute form, and there was already 
an air of preparedness about activity in the Balkans.56 A joint attack by Greece, 
Bulgaria and Serbia would obviously be disastrous for the Ottoman presence in 
Europe, while a minor defeat of the Ottoman army might cause serious 
complications within the internal affairs of the empire, including a revolution. 
These considerations were the underlying factor in the decision of the Ottoman 
government to mobilize a massive military force, which was more than enough to 
overcome the Greek army.57  
The apprehension of the Ottomans about the Balkans was not unfounded. 
The escalation of crisis between Greece and the Ottoman Empire excited both the 
Bulgarian and Serbian governments greatly with the calculation that any advantage 
to be obtained by Greece would mean a change in the regional balances at their 
expense.58 At the beginning, the Bulgarians had the idea of benefiting from the 
crisis. With an implicit threat of mobilization, they demanded from the Ottoman 
Empire establishment of a synod, with five Bulgarian priests, in İstanbul59 as well 
as appointment of Bulgarian metropolitans and commercial agents to certain towns 
in Macedonia.60 Yet the sultan constantly evaded putting these demands into the 
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agenda by pointing out the financial and political difficulties he had to handle 
first.61  
In order to double the effectiveness of its efforts, the Bulgarian government 
also initiated rapprochement with Greece. In January 1897, a Bulgarian legation 
was opened in Athens, and Konstantin Stoilov, the Bulgarian premier, suggested 
the Greek government to exert pressure on the Sublime Porte jointly with the 
demand of reforms in Macedonia. The Greek government, envisaging the partition 
of the region, did not accept this idea.62 Nevertheless, the Greeks would love to see 
Bulgaria, and also Serbia, fighting on their side against the Ottoman army. If they 
assured the help of these two states, the Greeks contemplated, with the support of 
irregulars trained by the Ethnike Hetairia, they could overcome the Ottomans and 
obtain not only Crete; but also Epirus and a part of Macedonia.63 The Ottomans 
were also aware that a coalition of these three states could set the entire Macedonia 
in flames. Bulgarian revolutionary committees had already begun to operate in the 
region64 and, after its annexation of Eastern Rumelia, a further move by Bulgaria 
on Macedonia was predictable. Since the military transportation was carried out by 
land, an armed attack from Bulgaria could put the Ottoman army in a difficult 
position.65 As a measure against an aggression from the Bulgarian side, Hâfız 
Mehmed Bey, the governor of Kosova, advised the Porte that military forces in 
towns that were close to the Bulgarian border and mostly inhabited by Bulgarians, 
such as Palanka, İştib, Osmaniyye, Koçana and Kratova should not be removed, 
but reinforced even further.66 The Ottoman government frequently sent orders to 
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the army commands at Edirne and Selânik that every measure should be taken 
against a Bulgarian assault, especially when the transfer of military forces was still 
in progress.67    
As regards Serbia, a report sent from the legation in Belgrade on 23 
February increased fears in İstanbul. Ahmed Tevfik, the Ottoman minister, wrote 
that although King Aleksandar Obrenović pledged that Serbia, in case of war 
between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, would remain strictly neutral, Serbian 
people, along with a number of politicians, were harshly criticizing the friendly 
policy of the king towards the sultan. They were extremely disturbed to see that 
this policy had never yielded any positive result for Serbia while Bulgaria and 
Greece had acquired certain concessions through hostility. The preceding 
expectation of the Serbians was the reopening of Serbian schools in Macedonia and 
appointment of a Serbian metropolitan there. The minister strongly advised his 
government to resolve these questions as soon as possible to avert hostilities by 
Serbia, and added that “faced with the threat of Bulgarian committees, driving the 
Serbians towards at least neutrality is vital for our security in the Balkans.”68 The 
sultan, reluctant to accept the Serbian demands, intended to sign a military 
convention with this state.69 But this intention was not materialized.    
While the Ottoman suspicions towards Bulgaria and Serbia remained alive, 
these two states came to an understanding on a common policy towards the 
Ottoman-Greek crisis and the Macedonian affairs. When its attempt to cooperate 
with Greece fell through, the Bulgarian government turned its face to Serbia. The 
Serbian government, as well as the king, was already willing to reconcile 
differences with Bulgaria, as Serbia was not ready to engage in a conflict at that 
time. At the end of February, Aleksandar visited Sofia and concluded a secret 
agreement with Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria. According to Article 2 of this 
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agreement, neither of the parties should engage in a unilateral action which could 
upset the status quo in the Balkans. Article 3 stipulated cooperation in religious and 
educational issues concerning Macedonia.70  
 
 
4. 4. The Verbal Note of 2 March: The First Diplomatic Effort by the Powers 
 
Towards the end of February, the Great Powers were also at the brink of an 
agreement, concerning the measure to be applied in Crete. As it was clear that the 
aforementioned proposal of Britain, stipulating synchronized removal of Greek and 
Ottoman troops from the island, would not be supported by the other governments, 
the British did not stick to this idea as strictly as before. Actually, there were 
certain signals that Continental Powers could initiate drastic measures without 
waiting the consent of Britain.71 Thus, Britain turned to the Russian proposal, 
which had already been declared as acceptable by the other Powers. With the desire 
to reduce the pressure on the Greek government, Salisbury suggested the Russians 
to submit an “official summons” to Greece rather than an “ultimatum,” to remove 
the phrases “immediately” and “extreme rigor,” both depicting the future measures 
to be applied if Greece rejected the summons, from the proposal, and to extend the 
allowed delay of the Greek reply to six days.72 All of the suggestions were accepted 
by Russia and the British were finally convinced. The two points in the Russian 
proposal was communicated to the cabinets of İstanbul and Athens on 2 March as a 
verbal note. In addition, the latter was summoned to recall its naval and military 
forces from Crete within a period of six days, and notified that the Powers would 
resort to coercive measures if the summons was not complied with.73  
On the other hand, a diluted version of the British proposal, stipulating the 
withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Crete, was prepared by the ambassadors in 
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İstanbul on 1 March, as a memorandum to be appended to the verbal note. 
According to this document, as soon as the island was evacuated by the Greek 
troops, Ottoman troops in Crete would be concentrated in the fortified places which 
were occupied by European detachments at that time. After receiving approval 
from their governments, the ambassadors submitted this additional memorandum to 
the Sublime Porte on 5 March.74  
 
 
4. 4. 1. The Ottoman Response to the Verbal Note 
 
While submitting these communications, the ambassadors repeatedly 
requested the Ottomans to restrain the Muslim Cretans from committing hostilities 
against the Christians, to act with extreme caution on the Greek border and 
especially not to utilize local paramilitary troops (başıbozuk) in Macedonia against 
the Christians. The Ottomans were already committed not to engage in any 
adventurism and to follow the advices by the Powers with maximum care. This is 
because, at a time when the Great Powers were, at least in appearance, intervening 
in the crisis on the side of the Ottomans, any single act of hostility by Muslims 
against Christians, either in Crete or in the border, would infuriate the Europeans 
and might result in a volte-face on their policy. The fragility of the situation 
imposed the ironically bothersome task of containing its subjects against a mass of 
merciless insurgents in Crete, while endeavoring to defend its border against 
infiltrations and attacks of irregulars with an extreme control on its own troops. 
Both the sultan and the government did their best to perform this task. Numerous 
categorical orders were sent to the army commands at Yanya and Alasonya that no 
action that could breach the peace should be occasioned.75 With an imperial decree 
dated 23 February, employment of paramilitary troops was also banned. On 2 
March, the Council of Ministers decided to apply serious and vigorous measures to 
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influence the Muslim Cretans not to engage in any activity that could “threaten the 
security on the island and expand the difficulties in foreign policy.”76      
The reply of the Ottomans to the verbal note of the Great Powers was 
totally in accordance with this pacific policy. With a verbal note, dated 6 March, 
the Sublime Porte declared its desire of insuring the maintenance of peace and 
accepted the autonomy of Crete in principle, assuming the right of discussion with 
the ambassadors on the form and details of the administration to be established in 
the island.77 Yet the Ottomans did not respond the additional memorandum of 5 
March immediately, since a positive response to this document entailed a serious 
commitment. Before making such a commitment they rather preferred to see the 
course of events, especially to determine the attitude of the Greek government as 
well as the resolution of Europe. On March 14, when it was realized that the 
collective effort by the Great Powers was still far away from yielding a concrete 
result, the Sublime Porte replied to the memorandum by stating that the 
concentration of Ottoman troops was a matter to be discussed after the withdrawal 
of Greek forces from the island.78 
 
 
4. 4. 2. The Greek Response to the Verbal Note 
 
In Europe, it was generally believed that the resolution of the Powers, 
which was observable in the verbal note of 2 March, would induce the Greeks to 
act in a reasonable way,79 but this belief shortly proved wrong. The Greek 
government responded to the verbal note of the Powers on 8 March, which was the 
last day of the allowed period, with a long reply. Although, the reply stated, the 
Greek government totally shared the desire of the Great Powers to preserve general 
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peace and had the willingness to help this cause, it could not be indifferent to the 
perpetual sufferings of the Cretans, who shared the same race, religion and sect 
with the Greek people. With the alleged justification that those troops were 
working for the same goal with the forces of the Great Powers in Crete, the Greek 
government requested the Powers to “reconsider their persistence” concerning the 
withdrawal of Greek troops from the island: 
Even if the operation of the naval forces of the Great Powers in the 
Cretan waters and their determination to prevent landing of Ottoman 
troops may render the presence of the Greek vessels needless; the Greek 
army should remain in the island for securing the peace and tranquility… 
In fact, if the duty of reinstalling peace and security is entrusted to our 
troops in the island, which deserve the full trust and confidence of the 
Great Powers, the desires of the Powers will be satisfied promptly and 
fully.  
In its reply, the Greek government also rejected the autonomy to be granted to 
Crete: 
We have no doubt that the new type of administration, planned by the 
Great Powers…shall never be able to restore peace and tranquility in the 
island; nor can it terminate the current hostilities… Thus, we would be 
under a big culpability if we did not request the Great Powers to 
relinquish their insistence for the establishment of autonomy in Crete; but 
to return the island, which was actually a part of Greece during the 
presidency of Kapodistrias –at the time when the other Greek provinces 
obtained their independence-, to Greece.  
In accordance with these views, it was proposed, at the end of the note, that after 
the restoration of order in Crete, the future of the island should be determined by 
the free will of the inhabitants.80 
It is obvious in the reply of Greece that the Greeks were truly optimistic that 
they could influence the Powers by carrying out a stiff and aggressive policy. The 
Greeks did not want the establishment of autonomy in Crete as they feared that if 
the Cretans once tasted the delights of self-government, their pan-Hellenic 
tendencies would vanish.81 With the presuppositions that the Ottoman Empire was 
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a powerless state on the verge of disintegration, that the Powers would not allow 
the breach of the Concert because of an Ottoman-Greek conflict, and that public 
opinion throughout Europe mostly supported the Greek cause -it was at least 
against the sultan-, the Greeks believed that Greece could annex Crete through an 
ostensible challenge against both the Ottoman Empire and Europe.82 In February, 
excitement of the masses had spread to the government. Deligiannis and Colonel 
Metaxas, the minister of war, appeared quite sympathetic towards war against the 
Ottoman Empire.83 Especially the former was openly “pandering” to the 
nationalistic and warlike sentiments of the Greek populace.84 Even the king, who 
had been known as a pacific figure, was signaling that he would not be a mediator 
between his public and the Powers anymore. He openly declared that he was 
resolute to accomplish the annexation Crete, and the Powers should regard this as a 
natural right of Greece, similar to the occupation of Cyprus by Britain, Schleswig-
Holstein by Germany and Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary.85  
Although his subjects were delighted with the attitude of King George; 
whether he really believed that Europe would allow Greece to annex Crete was 
rather questionable. The king’s pan-Hellenist expressions can well be attributed to 
his concerns with domestic politics. Since the actual intervention of the Powers, the 
Greek public had been advocating the idea of fighting the Ottomans in the north if 
they were not allowed to do that in Crete.86 On 13 March, the French minister in 
Athens wrote to his government that “it is impossible to ignore the intensity of the 
national feeling which directs everyone towards the border. Such a feeling has not 
been observed in Greece since the War of Independence.”87 In addition, the Ethnike 
Hetairia, which had become powerful enough to be called an imperium in imperio, 
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began to intimidate the king by asking either to follow the motion of Hellenism or 
leave the throne at once.88 The king was convinced that his choice lay between 
going for war and internal revolution.89 Any attempt by the king to stop the 
expedition would probably result in an internal chaos in Greece. In this respect, it is 
even possible to assume that he supported the warlike overtones in his country with 
the expectation that the Powers would eventually intervene and give an end to the 
Greek venture in Crete.90  
Furthermore, both the government and the king were aware that their 
insistent defiance could result in a blockade of their ports by the Powers. Such an 
outcome would definitely exasperate the Greek public and voices of the war 
supporters would thus increase to a higher pitch. But since the blockade would 
render the maritime transportation impossible, transfer of the Greek army to the 
Ottoman border would be a difficult and slow process. Expecting a prompt and 
decisive move by their government, the Greeks would respond the protraction with 
a revolt, which would ensue in the fall of government, and even the deposition of 
the king. In order to avert this, the army had to be mobilized as quickly as possible. 
In short, both for King George and Deligiannis, pushing the country recklessly 
towards an external conflict seemed to be the only way to avoid an internal crisis.91 
Since neither had enough courage to counter the stream and tell their people that 
Greece was not ready for war,92 they preferred to intimidate the Ottomans and the 
Europeans through military preparations and urge them to yield. If their bluff 
worked they could obtain Crete, but if it fell through, nobody in Greece could 
blame them for being apathetic to the Megale Idea.  
Driven on the one hand by irredentist aspirations, and concerns on domestic 
politics on the other, the Greek government decided to hasten military preparations 
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on the Ottoman border. Owing to the fear of a prompt blockade, this decision had 
been put into action before the Greek reply to the verbal note of the Powers was 
submitted. Thus, military reservists were called out and armed forces began to be 
dispatched to Thessaly and Epirus.93 These preparations produced rumors that in 
the face of the pressure from the Great Powers to withdraw their troops from Crete, 
the Greeks would attack the Ottoman border without an official declaration of 
war.94 When the representatives of the Powers in Athens requested an explanation 
from the Greek government, Skouzes assured them that Greece would remain 
strictly on the defensive, and would not be an element of discord in Europe.95 But 
the activities of the Ethnike Hetairia were increasing the tension on the border and 
causing a considerable level of apprehension on the Ottoman side. 
 
 
4. 5. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 2 
 
The Greek reply to their verbal note was regarded by the European cabinets 
as a blatant defiance. Apart from the furious reactions by the German, Russian and 
Austrian foreign ministers, Hanotaux believed that the reply included certain 
unacceptable terms, and its ulterior object was to separate the Powers.96 But 
Salisbury was still trying to find a way to resolve the crisis by satisfying the Greeks 
rather than offending them. His concerns on domestic politics still preceded those 
on foreign affairs. As Lord Curzon, the British undersecretary of state for foreign 
affairs, later confessed, the government “had had to reckon with the phil-Hellenic 
tendencies in the country, which had permitted action by England against Greece, 
but not action in favor of Turkey.”97 On 9 March, Salisbury told Count Deym, the 
Austro-Hungarian ambassador, that it seemed to him “worthy of consideration 
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whether the Greek force might not be divided and placed under officers of the 
Powers, serving, of course, under the flag of the Power to whom they were 
assigned. This arrangement could furnish the material for a gendarmerie, probably 
better fitted than any other to keep order in a Greek district.”98 Unsurprisingly, this 
suggestion of Salisbury, which obviously intended to legitimize the fait accompli 
by the Greek government, did not receive any support from the other cabinets. 
Muravyov openly criticized this idea on the grounds that such a concession would 
not only encourage the Greeks, but also prove a dangerous example for the other 
parts of the Ottoman Empire.99  
In the meantime, the admirals in Crete were authorized by their 
governments to apply required measures to assure the security of the island. Their 
first target was the Greek Consulate in Hanya, which was generally recognized as a 
hotbed of intrigue and conspiracy in the island.100 On 8 March, the admirals forced 
Baraklis, the Greek vice-consul, to board a ship and leave the town along with a 
number of Greek journalists. Their expulsion was carried out strictly despite 
furious protests both from the consul and the Greek government.101 On 13 March, 
Goluchowski stated to the Greek chargé d’affaires that: “The naval commanders 
would naturally remove from Crete any person whose presence there they 
considered dangerous.”102 
In anticipation of the Greek reply to the verbal note of the Powers, the 
admirals had unanimously proposed, on 5 March, to their respective governments a 
project for the re-stabilization of affairs in Crete. The project included the 
following clauses:  
1. Blockade of the Piraeus and the principal Greek ports.  
2. Blockade of Crete.  
3. Governments to make Proclamation of blockade.  
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4. All Greek ships met at sea to be escorted to Milo, where they will be 
placed in blockade.  
5. Every hostile act committed by Greek ships against a ship of the Six 
Powers will be considered as a declaration of war with the Six Powers.  
6. Every Greek torpedo-boat will be repelled by gun fire if she comes 
within range of the ships of the Powers.103 
Although the project was agreed to by the admirals, its implementation 
required approval by every Great Power as such a forceful plan of action would 
upset the European Concert if put into force without unanimity. As expected, the 
British proved to be the most averse party to undertake the project. Especially the 
idea of blockading the Greek ports did not convince Salisbury at all. He believed 
that the blockade of Crete, which he regarded “more efficacious and less 
exasperating” than that of the Piraeus, would suffice.104 Yet, after receiving the 
Greek reply to the collective verbal note of the Powers, the German, Russian and 
Austro-Hungarian governments had begun to insist on the blockade of the Piraeus 
even more fervently. Especially the Germans used the threat that they would 
withdraw their forces from Crete if the Powers relented to Greece after such an 
overt defiance.105 According to Marschall, the state of anarchy which existed in 
Crete owed much to the presence of the Greek troops, and the security on the island 
could not be restored as long as a single Greek soldier remained there. 
Furthermore, he believed that the king of Greece would never risk his throne by 
yielding to “half-measures” by Europe; but only to a resolute and united attitude by 
the Powers would persuade him, as well as the Greek public.106 Muravyov thought 
in the same way as his German colleague. He told Nicholas O’Conor, the British 
ambassador in St. Petersburg, that as soon as the ports of the Piraeus, Patras and 
Volo were blockaded, the Greeks, affected economically from that, would assume 
a more reasonable attitude.107  
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Realizing the determination of these two states, Salisbury soon softened his 
attitude. In fact, he was personally disposed towards the blockade of Crete and the 
port of Volo, but this project was firmly opposed by certain members of the 
government. After a few sessions in the cabinet, he formally declared to the various 
ambassadors that Britain agreed only to the blockade of Crete;108 by adding that the 
blockade of the Piraeus might be considered as necessary if the other measures 
failed.109 The Italian government simply followed British policy, and would not 
take part in any action without participation of Britain.110 The reluctance of Britain 
and Italy put the French government into a difficult position, as its government was 
eager to keep following Russia’s lead, but the tide of phil-Hellenism was constantly 
rising among the French public.111 The most illustrious orators in France, such as 
Jaurès, Clemenceau, Denys-Cochin and Millerand had already begun to protest 
against government policy,112 and hundreds of French students were offering their 
services to the Greek ambassador in Paris.113 The government feared that if the 
public pressure rose to a certain level to change French foreign policy, the 
agreement of the Powers on a certain common policy would be even more difficult, 
and the European Concert could be disrupted as a result.  
 
 
4. 6. The Escalation of Tension at the Ottoman-Greek Border 
 
The lack of a monolithic attitude among the Powers towards Greece was 
making the question even more complicated. The insistence of Germany, Russia 
and Austria-Hungary for a blockade on Greek ports caused a fear among the 
Greeks that they could not send enough forces to the Ottoman border in case of 
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military conflict. On the other hand, the moderate policy of Britain induced the 
Greeks to believe that their challenge could yield a result without waging war, just 
as the way in which Thessaly had been ceded to Greece in 1881.114 These 
circumstances assured the Greeks that the most rational response to these two 
potential outcomes seemed to be assembling armed forces on the Ottoman frontier 
as soon and much as possible. This is because, such an action would not only 
render the blockade useless; but also be perceived in Europe as a threat to general 
peace, urging the Powers to settle the question in a peaceful way. European 
cabinets, influenced by their public opinion, could put pressure on the Ottoman 
government to cede territory to Greece.115 Even if military preparations of Greece 
were regarded by the Ottomans as provocation and precipitated a war with them, 
the Powers would probably intervene in favor of the Greeks on the grounds that the 
peace had been breached by the Ottoman side. As articulated by E. Ashmead 
Bartlett, “it was simply the performance of a shrewd but hard-pressed gambler, 
who, being in a desperate case, stakes heavily upon a single throw, knowing that, 
even if he loses, his position will not be much worse.”116 
With these calculations, full mobilization was declared in Greece on 15 
March,117 and a massive maritime transportation of arms and munitions from the 
Piraeus to Volo started immediately. The Ethnike Hetairia, by declaring that it was 
too late for the Greek people to step back from fighting, was simultaneously 
sending its armed bands to Thessaly and laying the groundwork for a general 
insurrection in Macedonia.118 The number of provocations on the Ottoman border 
increased accordingly.119 A law was passed in the Greek parliament to make it 
possible for Greeks from abroad to enlist as volunteers in the army with the same 
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status as Greek nationals.120 As a result, with the encouragement and assistance of 
Greek consuls, volunteers from Samos, İzmir, Cyprus and other parts of the 
Ottoman Empire began flowed to Greece.121 When these activities were evidently 
pushing Greece into war, Smolenski, the Greek minister of war, resigned from his 
position on the grounds that Greece was not prepared enough for such a big 
campaign.122  
The permanent increase in the hostile attitude of Greece and the uncertainty 
of the European intervention caused a considerable degree of apprehension among 
the Ottomans. A Greek offensive on the frontier was imminent and reports from 
Bulgaria indicated that the Bulgarians were about an attack in Macedonia if they 
became convinced that Greece would acquire a piece of land from the Ottoman 
Empire.123 In order to avoid a large-scale conflict, the Sublime Porte immediately 
resorted to military and diplomatic measures. Commanders in the region were 
instructed that the army should keep vigilance against any kind of border violation, 
while the peace should be fully respected and the order of troops should be 
preserved with maximum care.124 The existing troops on the border were reinforced 
by forming reservist units from the Albanians.125 A fleet under the command of 
Hasan Râmi Paşa was sent to the Dardanelles to avert a Greek naval operation on 
İstanbul.126 In addition, concerns about the inclusion of Serbia and Bulgaria to the 
conflict were immediately presented to Nelidov. The Russian ambassador assured 
the sultan that the Bulgarian and Serbian governments would not take any action 
against the Ottoman Empire, as they had promised upon categorical warnings by 
the czar, adding that the Ottoman government should refrain from sending troops to 
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its borders with these two countries, in order not to stimulate nationalist sentiments 
there.127 
Despite having concentrated a strong army on the Greek frontier, the 
Ottomans were regarding the use of force as the last resort. The potential 
complications of military confrontation with Greece were well known in İstanbul, 
and the sultan was of the opinion that even a war concluded by victory would be at 
the expense of the state.128 He was still hopeful that the conflict could be settled 
diplomatically with Greece, but he was reluctant to initiate direct negotiations with 
the Greeks due to the fear of a reaction by the Great Powers.129 Therefore, 
notwithstanding the prolongation of the negotiations in Europe, the Ottomans still 
expected the solution from the Great Powers, and kept requesting them to 
implement coercive measures on Greece at once.130  
 
 
4. 7. The Blockade of Crete 
 
In the middle of March, the Powers finally came to a collective decision on 
the measures to be applied in Crete. These measures basically included the 
blockade of Crete against all vessels carrying the Greek flag, and the establishment 
of de facto autonomy in the island. On 15 March, Hanotaux declared in the French 
parliament that the land forces of each Great Power in Crete would be reinforced 
by an additional 500-600 soldiers.131 Two days later, the transportation of troops to 
Crete began and the admirals were instructed by their governments to blockade the 
island.132 The Greek and Ottoman governments were notified of the decision of the 
Great Powers on March 18 and 19, respectively. The blockade was officially put 
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into effect on 21 March, at 8 o’clock in the morning.133 In addition, the admirals 
announced to the Cretans that the island would be henceforth completely 
independent in its internal affairs from the supervision and inspection of the 
Ottoman government, and invited them to put down their arms immediately.134 
However, this proclamation did not make a big impact among the insurgents and, 
due to their demand of union with Greece, they kept their obedience to Colonel 
Vassos.135 In addition, the extreme length and irregularity of the Cretan shores also 
rendered the blockade ineffective.136 Under these circumstances, it was soon 
realized that the latest effort by the Powers was still insufficient to pacify the 
island. Alfred Biliotti, the British consul-general in Hanya, wrote to his 
government that the latest effort by the Great Powers was not sufficient to prevent 
war.137 The admirals requested further steps from their governments: i.e. 
appointment of a governor-general to Crete, reinforcement of the troops under their 
command, organization of the new regime in the island, application of pressure to 
the Greek and Ottoman governments for withdrawing their forces, and blockade of 
Piraeus.138 
 
 
4. 8. The Search for a Collective Action in Europe: Episode 3 
 
 
4. 8. 1. Further Negotiations 
 
Actually, it was well known in Europe that the blockade of Crete and 
establishment of autonomy there were only half-measures to end the crisis between 
Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The bellicose actions of Greece, followed by the 
military preparations on the two sides of the frontier had transformed the Cretan 
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question into a large-scale Ottoman-Greek conflict, shifting the locus of the crisis 
from Crete to Thessaly and Epirus. This is why the negotiations on a collective 
action to stop Greek aggression continued among the Powers even as the measures 
to be applied in Crete were agreed on. The three continental empires were still 
underlining the necessity of blockading ports on the Greek mainland in order to 
prevent the imminent war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. On 17 March, 
Marschall told the British ambassador that unless immediate pressure was put upon 
Greece, war would be inevitable; because if the Greeks attacked, the Powers could 
not prevent the Ottoman Empire from defending itself.139 But, on the same day, 
Salisbury informed the Germans that, due to the prominence of phil-Hellenism in 
his country, the British would continue to be “lookers-on” in case of war.140  
The indifference of Britain was developing into a threat to the European 
Concert. At that time Russia was pushing, at least in appearance, for rapid action to 
keep the Greeks away from an armed conflict with the Ottomans. Muravyov, 
urging the Powers to blockade the port of Volo without any delay, declared that if 
Britain abstained at that juncture, the responsibility of a war between the Ottoman 
Empire and Greece and a general conflagration in Macedonia would fall on the 
British government.141 Goluchowski, realizing that the blockade could be carried 
out more effectively without participation of Britain, tried to find a middle way 
between Britain and the continental Powers by suggesting the British government 
that the Greek ports could be blockaded by the other Powers while Britain joined 
only in the blockade of Crete.142  
Yet the British government was hesitant to approve such an action due to 
the firm opposition from the Liberal Party. Instead, on March 20, Salisbury 
proposed the other Powers to urge the Greek and Ottoman governments to 
withdraw their forces up to 50 miles from their side of the frontier. If Greece 
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refused to comply with the summons, Britain would approve the blockade of Volo. 
In case of a refusal from the Ottoman side, Britain would “be ready to partake in 
the measures of coercion that the Powers would regard essential to be adopted.”143  
This proposal did not receive any support from the other Powers, except 
Italy.144 Hanotaux and Muravyov expressed their fears of an incursion by Greek 
irregulars into Ottoman territory, and stated that 50 miles is too great a distance for 
the Ottoman troops to defend their frontier.145 Goluchowski’s reply was that war 
was imminent and addressing the summons to the two governments would be 
nothing but loss of time.146 The German government was already unwilling to 
address a further communication to Greece before the Greek troops were 
withdrawn from Crete. Above all, the blockade of Volo was still regarded urgent 
and indispensable by these four Powers because the Greeks were shipping all their 
troops and supplies from the Piraeus to this port.  
Under these circumstances, on March 23, Salisbury made a final declaration 
that although Britain was prepared to join the blockade of the Greek littoral if and 
when the other Powers agreed on it unanimously; London would not participate in 
the blockade of Volo and the Piraeus.147 At the same time, the two governments 
would be urged to withdraw their forces to a convenient distance from the frontier, 
and the Sublime Porte would be informed that if the Ottoman forces crossed into 
Greek territory, that would be regarded as a hostile act against Britain.148  
 
 
4. 8. 2. Deadlock  
 
The declaration of Salisbury demonstrated once again the high level of 
influence of the public opinion and opposition on the British foreign policy. With 
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its dilatory attitude, the British government was virtually forsaking the European 
Concert. Hanotaux reacted to the proposal of Britain by telling Count Wolkenstein, 
the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Paris, “this is the end of the European 
Concert,” while Wilhelm regretted that if Germany had possessed a strong navy, 
the German viewpoint would have been received by the other Powers with much 
esteem.149 In response to the latest declaration of Salisbury, the Russian 
government decided to abandon its efforts for coercive measures as it was “jaded 
by waiting and seeing its paralyzed initiative.” Thus the attempts for a collective 
measure over Greece were suspended for some time.150 
However, the anarchy in Crete was still going on and the Greeks were 
taking further steps towards war. On March 26, with a royal decree, Prince 
Constantine was named commander-in-chief of the Greek army in Thessaly and 
was sent to Volo the following night.151 Small-scale provocations on the Ottoman 
border were still being perpetrated by the Greek irregulars.152 The imminence of 
war led the admirals in Crete to warn their governments once again. According to 
them, the time for half-measures was past, and in order to persuade the Greek 
government to comply with the resolution of the Powers, the Gulf of Athens should 
be blockaded immediately and Greek vessels should be “moved away, encircled 
and detained.”153 This firm warning of the admirals surprisingly changed the 
attitude of the British government. Finally winning the assent of his colleagues to a 
compromise, Salisbury declared at the end of March that Britain was ready for the 
blockade of the Gulf of Athens whenever asked by the admirals, and approved 
collectively by the other Great Powers.154  
This was the most critical moment of the negotiations; as Salisbury’s 
declaration left it open to the Powers to take action. But, in fact, cabinets in Europe 
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were not totally decisive to do that. Since the admirals opposed sending their 
vessels, which were still being used in the blockade of Crete, to the Gulf of Athens, 
dispatch of massive reinforcements was required to commence the blockade.155 
Except Germany and Austria-Hungary, which still insisted on blockade, the Powers 
were disinclined to send additional forces to the Near East. Thus, they tried to 
evade this commitment with certain pretexts. Italy declared its reluctance to use 
coercive measures against Greece, by pointing out that the Greeks would be 
infuriated, while France posed equal contribution by the Great Powers as a 
prerequisite for its participation. The Russians, believing that the Greek troops had 
already been transported to Thessaly and the blockade could drive the Greeks 
towards hostilities, did not show any willingness to support this measure 
anymore.156 In short, the negotiations that had continued among the Powers ad 
nauseam came to a halt with no practical result.  
The disappearance of Russian disposition towards the blockade owes much 
to the clarification of the Balkan states’ attitudes. The primary concern of the 
Russians was to preserve the status-quo in the Balkans, and what they feared most 
was the possibility of a general conflagration in the region. This is why the 
Russians had taken the lead in urging Bulgaria and Serbia to keep neutral in case of 
war, while proposing the other Powers implementation of forceful measures on 
Greece to stop its aggression. Yet in mid-March, discovering the understanding 
between these two states, the Russians became convinced that neither was willing 
to upset the status-quo in the Balkans at that time. Since the possibility of a multi-
sided conflict had decreased, it was no longer a prudent strategy for them to insist 
on a blockade. First of all, the utility of the blockade was doubtful. Certain Powers 
were still reluctant to participate in the blockade and further negotiations on that 
would be disruptive upon the existing harmony within the European Concert. 
Furthermore, if the blockade was commenced with Russian initiative, the 
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reputation of Russia among the Greeks would be damaged seriously and that would 
be detrimental for the Russian influence over the competition in Macedonia. On 
condition that Bulgaria and Serbia would remain strictly unmoved, it would even 
be to the advantage of the Russians to stay out of the conflict and watch Greece and 
the Ottoman Empire, the two non-Slav states in the region, wear each other out.157  
 
 
4. 9. Further Developments in the Ottoman Empire and Greece 
 
At the end of March, a massive number of troops had been concentrated on 
both sides of the Ottoman-Greek frontier. But the overtones rising from each side 
were completely opposite. The Ottomans were extremely anxious about the 
developments and were willing to keep acting with utmost caution. Although they 
were confident that the Greek army would be defeated without much effort, the 
Ottomans were concerned with the possible repercussions of war and, thus, 
reluctant to have recourse to violent measures.158 According to them, peace had to 
be maintained, but, at the same time, the danger of invasion by the Greeks had to 
be averted. Especially the concentration of Greek irregular bands near the frontier 
caused great apprehension that these bands could cross the border and instigate a 
revolt in Macedonia. There were even some attempts at crossing the border and the 
Ottoman army promptly repulsed the intruders back to Greek territory. But they 
could not be pursued further, since the Ottomans were almost sure that any 
violation of the Greek border, even conducted with totally defensive concerns, 
would be severely opposed by the Great Powers, and, therefore, would serve the 
interests of Greece. On the other hand, occupation of even a very small portion of 
Ottoman territory by the Greeks, which would signify a change in the regional 
balances, would also create grave results for the future of the empire.159 Under 
these circumstances, the Ottoman army, while staying strictly on its side of the 
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border, had to be extremely careful not to allow any crossing by the Greek forces. 
This was a not an easy task, especially bearing in mind the fact that the frontier was 
considerably long and mountainous.  
Furthermore, even though Bulgaria and Serbia pledged neutrality, it was 
almost certain that neither would keep indifferent if the war spread to Macedonia. 
On 22 March, the Serbian king told the British minister in Belgrade that Serbia 
would keep its neutrality in case of war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire 
unless a massacre, directed towards Christians, took place in Kosova and 
Macedonia.160 This statement evidently meant that the Serbians were cautiously 
watching the developments and would take action if necessary. The attitude of 
Bulgaria was more or less the same. Under these circumstances, the Russians and 
Austrians, not to mention the Ottomans, were extremely anxious to keep the 
conflict limited. The latter especially grew apprehensive about the possibility of a 
general rising by not only the Christians in the Balkans, but also those inhabiting 
the other parts of the empire, particularly the Armenians. Accordingly, the Sublime 
Porte issued the following circular: 
While the state is engaged with the Cretan and Greek problems, even a 
small-scale strife between Muslims and non-Muslims could create grave 
results such as foreign intervention. Officials should always stay vigilant, 
keeping in mind the delicateness of the time. Millet leaders should be 
appropriately requested to duly execute the civil law of their 
communities. If an incident happens somewhere, local authorities who 
are responsible for public administration and security will be held 
responsible and penalized severely.161  
As for the Greek side of the frontier, what was observed there in general 
was a high level of excitement and resolution for war. The Greeks felt totally 
frustrated because their occupation of Crete, as well as their huge campaign of 
military preparation had not borne any fruit yet. According to them, by blockading 
Crete and discussing the blockade of Greek ports, the Great Powers were taking the 
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side of the Ottomans.162 If the Greek government gave in at that moment, all the 
preparations would go to waste and Greece, let alone obtaining a gain, could 
eventually be blamed by Europe for attempting to intimidate the Concert with false 
displays. Thus, in the eyes of the Greeks, the only way to end this deadlock seemed 
to be another outrageous move, a military challenge against the Ottoman Empire. 
Although they were aware of the imbalance between the two armies, in favor of the 
Ottomans, the Greeks still believed that the war could produce more favorable 
results than the actual situation. Above all, the Ottoman Empire was known to be 
worn out by perpetual financial crises and Armenian uprisings. If the Greeks were 
able to induce Bulgaria and Serbia to a joint action, that would be disastrous for the 
Ottomans and could yield territory to Greece in the Balkans. Alternatively, the 
Great Powers, intimidated by the hard attitude of Greece, might intervene before a 
serious confrontation between the Greek and Ottoman troops, and offer mediation 
which would be favorable for both sides. In any case, the Greeks calculated, taking 
the risk of war would grant some result, while succumbing to the opposition of the 
Powers would bring nothing.  
Although the majority of the Greeks had this point of view, both the king 
and the government still kept to their mixed attitude towards war. While being 
encouraged by the motivation of the public, the intimidations and encouragements 
by the Ethnike Hetairia, as well as the potential benefits a war could bring, they 
were also aware that Greece took an adventurous risk. If the calculations would not 
come true and the Great Powers, or the other Balkan states, would not involve in 
the conflict, there would be the danger of a humiliating defeat at the hands of the 
Ottomans. Such a defeat would be completely disastrous for the finances of 
Greece, which was actually in deep crisis, while injuring the reputation of the king 
and the government both at home and abroad. In addition, after a defeat, Greece 
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could lose its power to carry on the rivalry with the other Balkan states over 
Macedonia and that would be a big setback in the pursuit of the Megale Idea.  
These concerns led the Greek leaders to come to terms directly with the 
Ottomans. The request was made personally by Deligiannis through the Ottoman 
legation in Athens. The sultan immediately replied that his only desire was 
maintaining peace, and, if the Greek government agreed to withdraw its forces 
from the border and Crete, the Ottoman Empire would be ready to sign a 
convention, as before, against the destructive activities of banditry on both sides of 
the frontier.163 The leaders on both sides seemed to have similar tendencies, while a 
direct settlement between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was also desired by the 
Powers, at least by Russia and France.164 Alexandros Mavrokordatos, the Greek 
ambassador in İstanbul, was also highly discomforted with the current trends in his 
country, and willing to reinstate the peaceful relations between the two states.165 
However, after few deliberations, no result was obtained, simply because the 
Greeks did not cease dispatching troops to the frontier, making the Ottomans 
suspicious about their genuine intentions. After being requested by Mavrokordatos 
to act as a mediator before the sultan for a peaceful settlement, Hasan Hüsnî Paşa, 
the Ottoman minister of navy, wrote to Abdülhamid that: 
The Greeks, overwhelmed by the mobilization of a huge army, as well as 
the preparation of naval forces, by the Ottoman Empire in a quite short 
period of time, are in search of a tool for reversing their wrong policy. 
The attempt may even be a political plot to create the impression among 
the European Powers that Greece is acting in a peaceful manner.166  
It is hard to determine what the real intentions of the Greek leaders were at 
that time. But whatever they may be, their influence on the course of events was 
trivial. The die had been cast, and the war was resolved. People on the streets and 
in cafes were vehemently claiming that the time to realize the great cause of 
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Hellenism had finally come. Their nationalist and irredentist sentiments were 
bolstered by newspapers, which simply followed the domestic trends.167 An 
extreme level of excitement and overconfidence was observed in the Greek 
army.168 Bands of the Ethnike Hetairia, consisting of 1,200 to 1,500 men,169 were 
inspired by the arrival of Prince Constantine in Thessaly and were growing 
impatient to commence raids into Ottoman territory. Under these circumstances, 
leaders were no longer able to control the developments, let alone to reverse them. 
After his arrival in Thessaly, the crown prince had been advised by Deligiannis to 
hold the irregulars from crossing the border. A number of brigands that had 
trespassed Ottoman territory were accordingly arrested by Greek forces.170 But, 
only a few days later, the prime minister, under pressure of the public and the 
Ethnike Hetairia, retracted his advice. As long as the domestic pressures rendered 
war inevitable, he believed, it was better the war commenced sooner than later, 
because the Greek finances lacked the resources to keep the army mobilized for a 
long time.171 Therefore, without giving a direct order to the irregulars to fight, he 
asked the crown prince to let the irregulars act in their own way.172  
 
 
4. 10. The Verbal Note of 6 April: The Last Diplomatic Effort by the Powers 
 
Since the war was obviously imminent, the next question in minds was 
when it would break out. In European circles it was estimated that the Greeks 
would commence hostilities on 6 April, the independence day of Greece,173 when 
their excitement would reach its zenith. As a last attempt of deterrence, Muravyov 
                                                 
167
 Mille, 169-170. 
168
 Rose, 32-34. 
169
 Koliopoulos, 217. 
170
 BOA, İ.MTZ.(01), 19/840. 
171
 Devlet-i Aliyye ve Yunan Muhârebesi Hakkında Müdâvele-i Efkâr, translated by Abdî Tevfik 
(İstanbul: İkdâm, 1315), 73. 
172
 Austro-Hungarian Documents Relating to the Macedonian Struggle: 1896-1912, edited by F. R. 
Bridge (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), No. 21. 
173
 On 6 April 1821 (25 March of the Julian calendar) Archbishop Germanos, the Metropolitan of 
Patras, raised the Greek national banner and gave the first signal of the Greek revolutionary 
movement against the Ottoman Empire.  
 65 
proposed the other five Powers to address a further communication to the Greek 
and Ottoman governments.174 Unlike the project of blockading Greek ports, this 
proposal was immediately approved unanimously by the Powers. On 6 April, the 
following text was submitted to both governments as a verbal note:  
In face of the danger due to the concentration of massive forces on the 
Ottoman-Greek frontier by both states, the Great Powers, who desire the 
preservation of peace and tranquility, have instructed their ambassadors 
in İstanbul and Athens to declare that;  
In case of a war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, the aggressor 
will be held entirely responsible for the conflict,  
Whatever the result of the war may be, the Great Powers will in no case 
allow the aggressor to derive the least advantage from that.175  
If the Greeks had decided to set out to act on 6 April, this attempt of the 
Powers, which was actualized on the very same day, would have been too late. But 
the events did not turn out the way it was feared in Europe. The Ethnike Hetairia 
had not yet completed preparations for starting the raids and it was known that the 
Ottoman army was on the alert for countering a Greek attack.176 Besides, 6 April 
was a Tuesday, an ill-omened day with all Greeks.177 Hence, except a few 
nationalistic demonstrations, nothing happened in Greece on that day.  
The verbal note of 6 April was responded to by the Sublime Porte on 8 
April with a long reply. After indicating that the pacific intentions of the Great 
Powers were totally shared by the Ottomans, the Porte reminded the Powers that 
the only aim of the concentration of Ottoman troops at the frontier was to defend 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the empire. If the Greek government 
agreed to recall its forces from Crete and the Ottoman frontier, the note continued, 
the Ottoman troops at the frontier would also be withdrawn immediately, since the 
reasons which had necessitated their mobilization would have disappeared. In 
conclusion, it was stated that the Ottoman government was truly eager to witness 
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the reciprocal withdrawal of troops, and the Powers should encourage the cabinet 
of Athens to obtain such a result.178  
 
 
4. 11. The First Raid of Greek Irregulars 
 
Ironically, the first spark of the impending war was set on the same day on 
which the Ottoman government issued this peaceable statement. On the evening of 
8 April, around 10 o’clock, bands of Greek irregulars crossed the Ottoman border. 
They occupied the Kranya (Kranea) hill, surrounded a number of Ottoman 
guardhouses, blew up a blockhouse and cut the telegram lines. After invading the 
village of Baltinos (Baltimon) the insurgents proceeded towards the town of 
Grebene (Grevena).179 Although the number of the irregulars employed in the 
attacks was obviously not enough to overcome the Ottoman forces, the Ethnike 
Hetairia had estimated that they would be supported by Christians living in the 
Ottoman territory. After crossing the border, the irregulars attempted to instigate 
the local Christian population to join their attack. But these attempts proved 
fruitless. After gaining a few minor successes, the bands were dispersed and driven 
back to Greece in a short time.180  
These incidents were immediately protested by the Ottoman government. 
These protestations were ignored by Skouzes as he claimed that no troops from 
Greece had participated in the attack. Instead, according to him, the perpetrators 
had been Macedonian insurgents, thus subjects of the sultan. Refusing any 
responsibility concerning the incidents, Skouzes protested the Ottoman government 
on the grounds that Greek outposts had been fired by Ottoman troops “without any 
reason.”181 On the other hand, Deligiannis informed the British and Ottoman 
ministers that the bands who had crossed were volunteers, “clad in fustanellas with 
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a distinguishing cap and a description of uniform with the letters ‘E.E.’ [i.e. 
Ethnike Hetairia] on them.” But the premier firmly rejected the allegations that 
regular troops had been employed in the attack and stated that the crown prince had 
strict orders to give no encouragement to the bands, and to remain on the defensive 
against an Ottoman offensive.182   
Yet the Ottomans strongly believed that the bands had been supported by 
the Greek army. Telegrams from the frontier indicated that the bands had utilized 
artillery, which was not a weapon owned by volunteer groups, and they had been 
directed by bugle-calls.183 A Greek captive confessed to Clive Bigham, the special 
correspondent of Times with the Ottoman army, that he was a reservist and he had 
been armed by the Greek army and dispatched to the frontier.184 On 9 April, the 
Council of Ministers evaluated the situation in an extraordinary sitting. Since these 
data were not based on official reports, the Ottomans did not have a strong casus 
belli. Hence, the council decided to communicate the latest incidents, including the 
information suggesting that regular troops had been involved in the crossing, to the 
Great Powers and to sound out them about whether they would still hold the 
Ottomans responsible if a major conflict arose with Greece.185 
The communication by the Ottoman government, dated 10 April, was 
responded by the Powers with sympathy, as the responsibility of Greece for the 
escalation of the crisis was obvious. Marschall replied that the latest incidents 
showed how right he had been when advising the Ottomans, as early as February, 
to get ready on the Greek frontier.186 The incidents also created great anxiety in the 
French government. Hanotaux, while instructing his minister in Athens to search 
the means of a concerted action before the Greek government,187 gave quite a frank 
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answer to Sâlih Münir Bey, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris, who delivered him 
the abovementioned note. Hanotaux admitted that the Ottoman government had 
always adopted a reasonable and deliberate policy, but the Powers had not found 
heretofore an adequately effective means of expressing themselves to Greece. He 
advised the ambassador that if the Greeks had really taken the offensive the 
Ottoman army should respond promptly, and added that: “I do not believe that the 
other Balkan states will involve in the conflict unless a rebellion and bloodshed 
occurs in Macedonia. But since there is always some possibility for such an 
incident, the Ottoman government should act with utmost equanimity, serenity and 
caution.”188  
 
 
4. 12. Going to War or Not: The Dilemma at İstanbul  
 
The Ottomans were indeed acting with utmost caution, and the sultan was 
unquestionably the most cautious of them. Since the dispatch of troops to the Greek 
border, he had issued constant orders underlining that if Greek irregulars crossed 
the Ottoman frontier without involvement of Greek regular army, and if the 
Ottoman army took the offensive in response, full responsibility of the conflict 
would be charged on the Ottomans and the positive attitude of the Great Powers 
towards the empire would vanish accordingly. But the latest incidents exhausted 
the patience of the majority of ministers in the Ottoman cabinet. Their primary fear 
was that the Greek irregulars could succeed in causing a general uprising in 
Macedonia. According to them, the Greeks had once again attacked with mixed 
irregular and regular forces, as they did in 1854, 1878 and 1886, and, under these 
circumstances, no responsibility could be placed on the Ottoman government for 
further hostilities. The views of German and French foreign ministers had also 
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confirmed, though implicitly, that the Ottomans had right to respond to the attacks. 
During the sitting on 11 April, the Council of Ministers assessed the situation and 
finally decided to recommend the declaration of war to the sultan with the 
following considerations:  
After crossing the border, they are going to arm and instigate the local 
Christians in order to create disturbances to the Ottoman army from 
inside and thus to prevent an Ottoman counter-offensive. Since Yanya is 
more suitable for attack, the Greeks may move the bulk of their forces to 
that front by leaving only a few battalions at Alasonya. If their assault on 
Yanya yields a positive result for them, God forbid, that can not only 
change the international balances; but also stimulate the Christian 
population all over Rumelia to rise up… In order to prevent such grave 
results, the Ottoman army, after checking the aggression, should initiate a 
swift counter-offensive without losing any time.189    
But it was not easy to induce the sultan to relinquish his extreme reluctance 
towards war. This is because he still believed that the Greeks would not dare to 
declare war on the Ottoman Empire, and that the latest incidents were one of their 
intrigues to provoke the Ottomans and attribute the responsibility of a future 
conflict to them. On 11 April, the very same day of the council’s recommendation 
for war, the sultan sent the following order directly to the headquarters in 
Alasonya:  
If the Greek regular forces attack without declaring war, fulfill your 
military responsibilities without deviating from the previous directions; 
and always provide information to the palace. In case of a bandit attack, 
as frequently underlined before, expel these bandits as promptly as 
possible; but you shall by no means cross the Greek border.190  
On the following day, the sultan issued a long reply to the recommendation 
of the cabinet. At the beginning of his irâde, the sultan underlined that the decision 
of the ministers was based upon reports claiming that Greek regular forces had 
participated in the latest incidents. But since these reports lacked substantial proof, 
declaration of war would not be a prudent action. European Powers had repeatedly 
warned the Ottoman Empire not to declare war until Greece engaged in an act of 
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hostility and aggression. The latest statement of Hanotaux had also portrayed an 
offensive by the Greek army as the precondition for an Ottoman response. But the 
Greek government firmly and repeatedly declared that regular troops had not been 
involved in the latest incidents and every measure was being taken to prevent such 
activities. This attitude of Greece, the sultan believed, was intended to obtain the 
compassion of Europe, and might even be encouraged by a Great Power behind 
closed doors. Hence, he continued, the proceedings could not be regarded as a 
simple confrontation and the friendship of the Great Powers, albeit ostensible, had 
to be preserved as much as possible. Otherwise, the empire would face the danger 
“to be subjected to a harsher reaction from Europe than what had happened in 
Navarino during the Greek revolution.” In conclusion, the sultan ordered that the 
state of peace should be maintained and the shortages of the army should be 
completed before deciding to wage war. Furthermore, with a verbal note, the Great 
Powers should be informed that the only desire of the Ottoman Empire was to 
defend its territories and if Greece was induced to withdraw its forces from Crete 
and the border, the Ottoman Empire would negotiate the autonomy of Crete with 
the Great Powers. Besides, an ultimatum should be given to Greece.191  
In accordance with the decree of the sultan, the Powers were informed by 
the Sublime Porte that the instance of provocation by the Greeks would not be 
considered a casus belli if such an incident did not happen again.192 Additionally, a 
verbal note to the Greek government demanded to stop the activities of the bands 
and warned that further violations of the border would be regarded by the Ottomans 
as committed by the Greek regular army.193   
However, the divergence between the views of the cabinet and the sultan 
was becoming more obvious than ever. While the former was advocating an 
energetic policy to end Greek aggression, the latter was still describing violations 
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of the border as “bandit attacks” and advising pacifism and caution. This attitude of 
Abdülhamid became a source of irritation for certain ministers. Particularly Rızâ 
Paşa, the minister of war, had no patience left for the Greek provocations. If these 
provocations were countenanced, according to him, other Balkan states as well as 
Austria-Hungary would also adopt aggressive policies for their causes over the 
region.194 Mehmed Said Paşa, the chief of the Council of State (Şûrâ-i Devlet), was 
of the opinion that peaceful measures, such as giving an additional ultimatum to 
Greece, would result in an international conference, which would not settle the 
question in favor of the Ottomans.195 Without blaming the sultan directly, the 
supporters of war attributed his extreme reluctance to the counsels of Arab İzzet 
Paşa, the second secretary of the palace (mâbeyn kâtib-i sânisi), who was known to 
have high influence on Abdülhamid’s decisions.196  
Although the sultan’s attitude was regarded by certain ministers as 
pusillanimity, his concerns were not totally unfounded. With the experience of the 
disastrous war against Russia in 1877-1878, he feared another large-scale campaign 
resulting in partition of the empire through international conference. It was almost 
certain that the Great Powers would disapprove the declaration of war by the 
Ottoman Empire if there was not enough proof on the involvement of Greek 
regular troops in the latest incidents. Even if the Powers would not react 
immediately and the war broke out, that would entail the danger of a general rising 
in Macedonia, which would again be followed by foreign intervention. It was true 
that the Great Powers were disposed to preserve the existing boundaries in the 
Balkans at that time, but a large-scale conflict in the region could change the 
balances and, thus, reverse the policy of the Powers.197 A slight success of the 
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Greeks would raise this risk to the maximum. This is why the sultan regarded the 
war as the last resort and wanted to be totally confident with the strength of his 
army before deciding to launch the campaign. On 13 April, the headquarters in 
Alasonya still reported that the army needed four divisions of soldiers, munitions, 
vehicles and other military supplies for attack.198 Under these circumstances, 
Abdülhamid was still anxious to see the pacific settlement of the conflict, which 
would probably be fulfilled by a collective action by the Powers. In accordance 
with the will of the sultan, Tevfik Paşa requested Baron von Saurma, the German 
ambassador, once more to apply the required coercive measures on Greece without 
delay. In reply, the ambassador stated his belief that the blockade on certain ports 
of Greece, including the Piraeus would commence in a few days.199  
Despite the optimism of the German ambassador, it was clear that there was 
a lack of unity among the Powers towards a drastic measure against Greece. 
Muravyov, describing the existing situation in Europe as a “crisis,” advised the 
Ottomans to maintain their prudence and caution.200 But the apparent lethargy of 
the Ottoman Empire in face of provocations coming from a smaller, and a 
Christian, state began to create a deep concern within the Ottoman public and 
army. It was commonly believed that the hesitation of the empire was damaging to 
its international reputation and, furthermore, encouraging the Serbs and Bulgarians 
to resort to self-help in Macedonia.201 If the sultan persisted in his refusal to order 
his troops to advance, his position could be similar to that of King George in the 
eyes of his subjects.202 
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4. 13. The Declaration of War 
 
On the night between 16 and 17 April, another incident took place at the 
Ottoman-Greek border. Greek irregulars, assisted by regular forces, attempted 
another raid in Ottoman territory and they were met by Ottoman troops with a 
counter-offensive. As soon as the first reports arrived from the frontier, the Council 
of Ministers convened in the Yıldız Palace. Most of the ministers were in favor of 
war, but since they also acknowledged the concerns of the sultan, the cabinet was 
not able to reach a decision easily. The sitting continued for hours. Rızâ Paşa, 
persistently stressing that the empire had to demonstrate its ability to resist external 
threats and assuring the ministers that the state had adequate resources to cover the 
expenses of an armed campaign, finally convinced the cabinet to decide on war. 
Then he was called by the sultan for a face-to-face discussion. Abdülhamid, 
thinking that a defeat would be completely disastrous for the empire, requested the 
minister to reevaluate the situation. In response, Rızâ Paşa indicated that the empire 
would face no lesser difficulties if there was no war. Eventually, in the evening of 
17 April, the sultan, albeit unwillingly, gave his consent and approved the minute 
of the cabinet which declared war on Greece.203 Diplomatic relations with Greece 
were ruptured. The headquarters in Alasonya was ordered to carry out “whatever 
was required militarily.”204  
  This order denoted implementation of the war plan against Greece, which 
had been designed in 1886 by Muzaffer, Ali Saib and Veli Rızâ Paşas, under the 
supervision of Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz.205 This plan basically stipulated 
remaining on the defensive in Epirus and moving forward swiftly in Thessaly. This 
is because while an offensive in the former would not yield a substantial result, a 
number of large Greek towns and, more importantly, the major route in north-south 
direction could be put under threat by an offensive in the latter. With such a threat, 
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the Ottomans would keep the battle on Greek territory and, thus, prevent a conflict 
between Muslims and Christians throughout Rumelia.206 In addition, a lightning 
attack with massive forces on Larissa and Trikkala would cut the Greek army’s 
route of retreat and force them to surrender.207 This was the best preferred strategy 
for the sultan, as it could enable the Ottomans to win the war in the shortest time 
possible. Prolongation of the war would not only create a significant financial 
burden, but also increase the possibility of complications within the empire, 
particularly in its Balkan territories.208   
Upon the authorization of the Sublime Porte, Turkish newspapers 
announced in the morning of 18 April that the war broke out and Greek nationals 
and vessels should leave the country in fifteen days.209 The Porte communicated 
the declaration of war to the Great Powers on the same day through its 
ambassadors in Europe. The text of the communication was prepared with extreme 
finesse in order not to give an impression that the Ottomans had an invasive 
purpose. After the policies and attitudes of the Greek and Ottoman governments 
were reminded with reference to earlier incidents, the communication was 
concluded as follows:  
The Imperial Government, as they have frequently stated, entertain no 
idea of conquest against Greece, and if they are now forced to accept war, 
for their legitimate defense in consequence of open hostilities on the part 
of Greece, it is simply for the protection of their most sacred rights and 
their integrity. If within a short time the Greek government withdraw 
their troops from Crete and their frontiers, the Imperial Government, in 
order to afford fresh proof of their pacific intentions, will not fail, on their 
side, to stop their military movements. Such is the sincere intention of the 
Imperial Government, who rely on the sentiments of equity and justice of 
the Great Powers.210   
The sultan had long believed that the audacity of Greece must have been 
based on encouragements by a Great Power, and the first Power that came to his 
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mind was usually Russia.211 He had assumed that an armed conflict in the Balkans 
would have been used as a pretext by the Russians, as happened in 1877, to declare 
war on the Ottoman Empire. Hence, after the outbreak of war with Greece, 
Abdülhamid felt obliged to address a direct communication to the Russian 
government, in addition to the abovementioned communication submitted 
identically to the six Powers. After explaining that the declaration of war was 
unavoidable under present circumstances, the sultan invited the Russians to 
“distinguish the aggressor and the oppressed with utmost equity despite the Greeks 
are Orthodox and strong family bonds exist between the Greek and Russian 
dynasties.”212  
While the Ottomans accused the Greeks of being responsible for the latest 
developments, the Greeks did the same for the Ottomans. With a royal declaration, 
which was read in the Greek parliament on 18 April, it was claimed that the 
hostilities had been initiated by Ottoman troops, as they had attacked the neutral 
zone without any reason. Greece, the declaration continued, had always pursued its 
“noble goal, which was imposed upon her by its duties towards civilization and by 
a sentiment that is possessed by every people towards their coreligionists and 
congeners,” by pacific means, but when the Ottomans declared war, the Greeks had 
no choice but to accept that.213  
 
 
4. 14. The Attitudes of the Great Powers towards the War 
 
The verbal note which the Powers had submitted to the Greek and Ottoman 
governments on 6 April had a remarkable influence over the attempts of the two 
sides to justify war. Both belligerents tried to convince the Great Powers that the 
entire responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities belonged to the other side. The 
reason for this effort was the fair belief that, regardless of who the eventual victor 
                                                 
211
 Türkgeldi, 3: 76. 
212
 BOA, Y.EE. (Defter), 1121, p. 29-30. 
213
 Turkey No. 11, No. 451; Driault and Lhéritier, 4: 391-393. 
 76 
was, any territorial, financial and political change the war would entail depended 
on the will and consent of the Great Powers. Bearing in mind numerous 
experiences the empire had suffered before, the sultan and the Porte feared that 
they would face the Powers once again, either in the battlefield or in a conference, 
if the responsibility of hostilities was charged on the Ottomans. On the other hand, 
the Greeks primarily wished to draw sympathy of the European public opinion by 
creating the impression that they were blameless and, furthermore, the oppressed 
side.    
As discussed earlier, all the Great Powers were disposed to preserve the 
status-quo in the Balkans, thus an Ottoman-Greek war was not desirable for any of 
them. But their common disposition did not produce a collective action to prevent 
the war. The efforts by the three “conservative” states, namely Russia, Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, to implement an effectively forceful measure to contain 
Greece had not come about as the three “democracies,” namely France, Italy and, 
above all, Britain, were somewhat influenced by their public against such an action. 
When the latter group tended to come to an accord with the former, it was too late 
to reverse the Greek mobilization through blockade. In addition, the assurance of 
neutrality given by Bulgaria and Serbia signified that even if war broke out it 
would be only a minor and local conflict. European correspondents in Macedonia 
were also reporting that a Christian insurrection in the region was exceedingly 
remote, and that even if it took place it would be promptly put down by the 
Ottoman forces.214 These circumstances left little motivation to the Powers for 
undertaking the costly and bothersome task of naval blockade. The fervent 
negotiations among the European cabinets for drastic measures were accordingly 
replaced by diplomatic efforts to prevent the war. 
The outbreak of war did not create any change in the attitudes of the 
Powers. This is not because their willingness for the preservation of the status-quo 
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had faded away, but simply because none of them regarded the war as a major 
threat for the balances in the Southeastern Europe. Above all, it was almost certain 
that the Ottomans would easily defeat the Greeks. This would be an agreeable 
result for the Powers, as an Ottoman victory over Greece would not only keep the 
Slavic states unmoved, but also deter the Greeks against further attempts that 
would threaten security of the Balkans.215 In this respect, permitting the war to take 
place was actually a more expedient strategy, at least for the “democracies,” than 
applying coercive measures directly on Greece. In addition, the Ottoman claims for 
territory after their victory could be easily refused with reference to the statement 
of the Porte that the only aim of the Ottoman Empire while waging war was 
defending its territory. On the other hand, in case of a surprise success of Greece, 
the Powers could still keep the status-quo, as they had already declared that the 
aggressor would not gain any benefit from the war. With these considerations, the 
Great Powers maintained their neutrality and set themselves to wait for a suitable 
time for intervention.216 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
EPILOGUE 
 
 
 
The Greek public and statesmen shared a common goal of “liberating their 
brethren abroad” since the establishment of modern Greece. In order to actualize 
the Megale Idea, the Greeks remained in search of a slightest opportunity for 
decades, and even took steps for this cause with a few attempts. By arousing 
nationalist and irredentist feelings in Greece, the Cretan crisis of 1896-1897 created 
an atmosphere which was suitable for another attempt. The public, opposition and 
the Ethnike Hetairia started to pressurize the king and government to lead the 
banner of phil-Hellenism once more. Both the king and the premier were cognizant 
of the financial and military shortages of Greece. But they were also aware that if 
they acted against the screams for war, they could be accused by the public of 
being apathetic to the Megale Idea and even be deposed through a civil war. In 
order to avoid such a catastrophe, they decided to take the audacious steps of 
dispatching a fleet to the Cretan waters, occupying Crete, mobilizing the Greek 
army and sending it to the Ottoman frontier. Through these actions, they expected, 
on the one hand, to receive the sympathy and support of their public and, on the 
other hand, to induce the Great Powers to offer some concessions to Greece for the 
sake of overall peace in Europe.  
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The Great Powers indeed did not want to see the crisis turn into a war. Yet 
they did not have any intention to make a diplomatic effort which would favor 
Greece. If the aggressive policy of Greece returned concrete results, other nations 
could follow this example. Initiating fresh competition over the Ottoman territories 
would entail rivalry and polarization in Europe. As long as none of them was 
willing to enter into competition in the Near East and Balkans that time, the Great 
Powers tried to convince the Greeks to retreat on their aggressive policy. But they 
did this only by diplomatic means, since the Powers could not agree upon a 
collective measure of coercion to be applied on Greece. The lack of a common will 
among the Powers persuaded the Greeks not to retreat, and encouraged them even 
further on keeping their defiance.  
The Ottomans were anxious to maintain peace. However, after the Greek 
occupation of Crete, they foresaw further aggressions by Greece and accordingly 
decided to amass a massive military force on the Greek border. In spite of the 
concentration of Greek troops on the other side of the border, as well as the 
ongoing provocative activities of the Greek irregulars, the Ottoman army retained 
its defensive position due to categorical orders by the sultan. But the crossings of 
border by the army-supported bands of the Ethnike Hetairia obliged the Ottomans 
to declare war on Greece.   
The Ottoman-Greek War broke out, no matter that the six Powers and the 
Ottoman Empire had been against it. In other words, the conservatism of seven 
states was not able to thwart the revolutionary overtones in Greece from prompting 
the war. Yet, although it had been believed earlier that a war between the Ottoman 
Empire and Greece could create serious complications in the Balkans, it was almost 
obvious at the outbreak of hostilities that the war would remain a minor and local 
conflict. First and foremost, the evident inequality between the strength of the 
Greek and Ottoman armies was a sign that the war would shortly be concluded 
with the victory of the latter. Indeed, against the massive force of the Ottomans, 
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which numbered around 120,000, the Greeks had to fight with an army of 75,000 
soldiers in total.1 Furthermore, it was known that the majority of the Greek officers, 
let alone the privates, lacked sufficient training and experience on warfare.2 Falkner 
von Sonnenburg, a German army major, observed that the Ottoman preparations 
were carried out with vigilance, reason and order unlike the “theater-like actions” 
on the Greek side.3 The Greek army also had a shortage of horses, weapons and 
munitions while the system of military transportation in Greece was somewhat 
primitive.4 A success by the Greek army seemed almost impossible unless an 
uprising broke out in Ottoman territories or the other Balkan states involved in the 
conflict on the side of Greece. Since none of these two developments seemed 
likely, the Great Powers did not have any motivation to intervene actively with the 
aim of preventing hostilities.  
The neutral attitude the Powers portrayed before and during the war did not 
please the Greeks at all. In face of the successive defeats of their army by the 
Ottoman forces, Greek statesmen tended to avert public and international pressure 
by declaring the Great Powers the scapegoat of the disaster. According to King 
George, the Powers, by uniting on the side of the Ottomans, “politically 
counterworked and actively opposed every action taken by Greece.”5 His former 
ambassador in İstanbul, Mavrokordatos, also believed that it was the attitude of the 
Powers which had escalated the Cretan Question towards an Ottoman-Greek war.6 
These declarations evidently support the argument that the warlike posture of 
Greece had been designed as a bluff rather than an actual defiance of the Ottoman 
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Empire as well as the Great Powers. Greek leaders expected that the Great Powers 
would eventually save them through some form of intervention.7 Yet since the 
Powers, owing much to the existing international conjuncture, remained unmoved, 
the bluff did not bear fruit and, moreover, left Greece alone and helpless against the 
militarily superior Ottoman Empire.   
Clive Bigham observed that in the eyes of the Ottomans the war was 
“purely a punitive enforcement of diplomacy” rather than being a religious or 
national campaign.8 Presumably, this is why the Yıldız Palace played the key role 
in the direction and supervision of the Ottoman army. Bearing in mind that the 
results of the war could be extremely influential on the empire’s foreign policy, 
Abdülhamid wanted to exercise full control over the proceedings in the battlefield. 
Following the declaration of war, a special military commission, which was to be 
headed by the sultan himself, was formed in the palace.9 The instructions on war 
plans and army formations were telegrammed to the headquarters from Yıldız and 
every single tactic to be used in the battlefield had to be firstly explained to and 
authorized from the commission, in other words, by the sultan. Edhem Paşa, the 
commander-in chief in Thessaly, had extremely little liberty in his decisions and 
practically worked as an intermediary between the army and the palace.10  
Although Bulgaria and Serbia had pledged their neutrality earlier, a threat 
of mobilization came from the former only a few days after the commencement of 
hostilities. The Bulgarian representatives in İstanbul repeated their demands for 
appointment of Bulgarian metropolitans and commercial agents to Macedonia and 
declared that the Bulgarian army would be mobilized if the Ottomans did not 
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accept the terms.11 This attempt of the Bulgarians was possibly a bluff to acquire 
certain rewards in return for their neutrality. The Serbians were also pushing, 
though less ardently, for the reopening of Serbian schools in Macedonia and 
appointment of a Serbian metropolitan to Üsküb. In order to prevent a Balkan 
coalition hostile to the Ottoman Empire, the sultan felt obliged to promise that the 
required berats would be granted to both Bulgaria and Serbia as soon as the 
conflict with Greece ended.12 This pledge, satisfying both states to a certain degree, 
decreased the apprehension in the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Europe, that they 
could involve in the war. Nevertheless, until the end of the war, the Great Powers, 
particularly Russia and Austria-Hungary, kept advising the Bulgarians and 
Serbians to respect the status-quo and preserve their neutrality.13 
The war was fought in two fronts, Epirus and Thessaly. Only a few major 
skirmishes occurred in the former,14 while the latter was the scene of the main 
course of the war. On 18 April, Ottoman forces seized the control of the Meluna 
Pass, an important passage in the north-south direction. On 23 April, the Greek 
army was defeated near Mati and, consequently, the town of Tyrnavos (Tırnova) 
was captured by the Ottoman army on the following day without any fighting. The 
Greek army, along with a considerable number of Greek people, retreated 
southwards, to the towns of Trikkala, Pharsalos (Çatalca) and Volo. The Ottoman 
army pursued the Greek forces and captured Larissa on 25 April. Three days later, 
Trikkala also fell into the hands of the Ottomans. The Greek public blamed the 
king and the government for the defeat and the hasty retreat of the army. Furious 
demonstrations were organized in the squares of Athens. In order to prevent 
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internal chaos, the king forced the Deligiannis government to resign on 28 April. A 
new cabinet was formed immediately by Rallis, the leader of the opposition.15  
After the capture of Larissa, the bulk of the Ottoman army proceeded 
towards the Aegean coast with the aim of blocking the transfer of reinforcements to 
the Greek army.16 In the last days of April, this force was checked by Greek troops 
under the command of Colonel Smolenskis on the hills of Valestinos (Velestin). 
But the Ottoman forces renewed the attack on 5 May, and forced the Greeks to 
retreat on the following day. While the Greek forces were retiring to Almyros 
(Ermiye) and Domokos (Dömeke), the Ottoman army captured Pharsalos and Volo 
on 6 and 8 May, respectively. After the capture of Volo, the Ottoman troops 
remained inactive for about one week, probably due to an order by the sultan with 
the expectation that the Powers would make an effort for peace.17   
Nevertheless, the efforts of the Ottomans in the battlefield could hardly 
produce a substantial result without the consent of the Great Powers. At the time of 
the conflict, their engagements in other parts of the world, internal difficulties, as 
well as the level of distrust among them dictated the Powers, nolens volens, to act 
in concert to maintain the status-quo in Southeastern Europe. Even if assisting one 
of the belligerents could be to the advantage of certain Powers, none of them dared 
to injure the existing, albeit shaky, harmony in Europe by engaging in unilateral 
action.  
As early as 21 April, Marschall had called Ali Gâlib Bey, the Ottoman 
ambassador in Berlin, and presented the “friendly counsels” of the emperor to him. 
Marschall told the ambassador that the Ottoman army would eventually defeat the 
Greeks and in order to forestall an intervention by the Great Powers at the end of 
the war and to generate a positive impression on them, the Ottoman Empire should 
prepare its terms of peace upon these principles:  
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1- The Greek government shall immediately withdraw its forces from 
Crete.  
2- The Sublime Porte shall categorically declare to the Greek government 
that it will accept the autonomous administration of the island, which will 
be established by the collective decision of the Great Powers and the 
Ottoman Empire.  
3- The Ottoman Empire shall not demand any pecuniary indemnity from 
the Greek government.18 
If these were the “friendly counsels” of the German emperor, who was supposed to 
be the European ruler which had the most intimate relations with the sultan, it is 
difficult to imagine a worse result for the Ottomans in case of an intervention by 
the Powers after their victory. Immediately after the capture of Larissa by the 
Ottoman army, Marschall reiterated these counsels of his emperor and advised the 
Ottomans to bring the campaign to an end soon.19  
The attitude of Germany is enough to indicate that the Great Powers were 
resolute to restore the status-quo-ante-bellum after the defiance of the Greeks 
would have been punished by the Ottoman army. During the visit of Emperor 
Franz Joseph and Goluchowski to St. Petersburg at the end of April, Russia and 
Austria-Hungary underlined the necessity of maintaining balances in the Balkans. 
This agreement entailed the localization of the Ottoman-Greek War and mediation 
in favor of Greece.20 Britain, France and Italy were obviously against any Ottoman 
territorial gain. Thus, the earlier declaration by the Powers that the aggressor would 
not gain the slightest benefit from the war was practically modified as “none of the 
two belligerents would gain anything.” But what would their attitude be if the 
Greek army proved superior and captured Ottoman territories is not an easy 
question to answer.  
Volo was a strategic location for the Greeks with the highest importance, 
since almost all supplies and reinforcements for the Greek army had been 
transported to the port of that town by sea and dispatched to the battlefield via 
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railroad then.21 The capture of Volo by the Ottomans thus signified that defeat was 
inevitable for the Greeks. On 8 May, Stephanos Skouloudis, the new Greek foreign 
minister, informed the representatives of the Great Powers that Colonel Vassos had 
already been recalled and all Greek troops in Crete would be withdrawn 
gradually.22 Two days later, he formally announced that the autonomy of Crete was 
recognized by Greece. Upon this declaration, the representatives of the Powers in 
Athens unanimously offered a proposal of mediation to the Greek government. The 
Greeks immediately accepted the proposal, stipulating that “Greece would not 
respond the amicable initiative and the utmost solicitude of the Powers better than 
leaving to them the protection of her interests and adhering unreservedly to their 
advices and recommendations.”23  
Undertaking the diplomatic patronage of Greece, the Powers made an 
appeal to the Sublime Porte for peace. In response, the Ottomans, in contradiction 
to their earlier declaration that the war was not waged for the purpose of 
occupation, tried to take advantage of their military victory. On 14 May, the 
Sublime Porte announced its demands for the suspension of hostilities. These 
demands included the retrocession of Thessaly, a pecuniary indemnity of 
10,000,000 Ottoman liras and renewal of the treaties between Greece and the 
Ottoman Empire, which meant the abolition of the capitulations that had been 
granted to the Greek nationals.24 On the same day, the sultan ordered Edhem Paşa 
to march on Domokos (Dömeke). This offensive was explained to the Great 
Powers as a response to the Greek attacks in Arta on 12 May and Gribovo on 13 
and 14 May,25 but it might also be a tactical move to strengthen the position of the 
Ottomans in the forthcoming peace negotiations. After a short but furious battle, 
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Ottoman forces were able to capture Domokos on 18 May and proceeded 
westwards, pushing the Greek army back.  
The night before the capture of Domokos by the Ottomans, the Russian 
czar, assuming the task of mediation for peace, sent a telegram to the sultan.26 With 
this telegram, after remarking the friendly relations between Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire, and congratulating the successes of the Ottoman army, he 
requested the sultan to cease hostilities immediately and accept the mediation of 
the Great Powers on behalf of Greece. This notice was quite similar to what the 
Austria-Hungarian Emperor had addressed to the Bulgarians when they defeated 
the Serbians in 1885, as it was intended to leave the victor frustrated due to the 
resolution of the Powers for preserving international balances.27 Nevertheless, the 
remarkably gentle phraseology used by the czar in his telegram convinced the 
sultan to give an end to hostilities, possibly with an expectation that the czar would 
countenance the Ottoman demands for peace.28 Although some Ottoman statesmen 
were against ceasefire unless a direct appeal was made from Greece,29 the sultan 
issued an irade complying with the request of the czar. Instructions were sent to the 
commanders in Epirus and Thessaly to communicate with their Greek counterparts 
for the suspension of fighting.30 Hostilities were terminated on 19 May and the 
ceasefire was signed the following day. 
The demands that had been raised by the Sublime Porte on 14 May were 
regarded unanimously by the Great Powers as unacceptable. The ambassadors in 
İstanbul submitted their counter-proposals to Tevfik Paşa on 25 May. With this 
memorandum, they declared that the Powers would only consent to a rectification 
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of the frontier based on strategic considerations and an indemnity which should not 
exceed the limits of the financial resources of Greece. The Ottoman demand for the 
renewal of earlier treaties with Greece was also declined on the grounds that 
“certain privileges and immunities have been conceded to the Hellenic subjects in 
virtue of arrangements concluded with the Great Powers could not be affected by 
the rupture of relations between Turkey and Greece.”31  
The peace negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, 
representing Greece, commenced on 4 June and continued throughout the summer 
as the Ottomans were unwilling to give up their demands. The sultan regarded 
especially the retrocession of Thessaly and the renewal of agreements with Greece 
as indispensable terms to be included in the peace treaty.32 He even wrote personal 
notes to the German emperor and the Russian czar, indicating that the Ottoman 
Empire was ready to undertake a portion of the Greek foreign debt in return for the 
town of Larissa.33 
Yet, since the Powers were completely against any change in the regional 
balances, they firmly opposed an acquisition of territory by the Ottoman Empire 
except minor rectifications on the Greek frontier to prevent future incursions by 
Greek bandits. The Ottoman demand for abrogation of the capitulations enjoyed by 
Greek nationals was also opposed, presumably due to the idea that such a practice 
could later be used by the Ottomans as an example for reducing the privileges of 
other nationals.34 Instead, the Powers suggested regulating the practice of the 
capitulations to eliminate abuses. In addition to these, the Powers, holding bonds in 
Greece, endeavored to reduce the Ottoman demands of war indemnity by pointing 
out that the economy and finances of Greece would not allow the payment of an 
extensive sum of money. Upon prolongation of the negotiations, the King George’s 
threats of abdication were received in Europe with anxiety and the Powers 
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increased pressure on the sultan accordingly.35 The diplomatic attempts by both the 
sultan and Tevfik Paşa were refused by the Great Powers. As Holstein stated, the 
sultan could “only offer resistance in questions on which Europe is divided and the 
Powers impede[d] each other by taking opposite views.”36 But during the peace 
negotiations, the Great Powers never relinquished their collective attitude against 
the Ottoman demands.  
On 12 June, the Sublime Porte acquiesced to strategic rectifications on the 
Greek frontier and reduced its demand of pecuniary indemnity to 5,000,000 liras on 
28 June. But the Powers insisted on their offer of 4,000,000. This offer was 
accepted by Tevfik Paşa in one month’s time.37 Finally, the preliminaries of peace 
were concluded by Tevfik Paşa and the ambassadors of the six Powers in İstanbul 
on 18 September. The peace treaty, which was basically an official confirmation of 
these preliminaries, was signed between Greece and the Ottoman Empire on 4 
December, in İstanbul.38 
The phrase that any territory that had ever been Christian would not be 
allowed to become Muslim was used as a motto by the European statesmen while 
opposing the retrocession of Thessaly. Rather than being based on merely religious 
concerns, this principle was more likely a policy for the maintenance of the 
European Concert. This is because, one of the basic problems of the Eastern 
Question was the elimination of the problems faced by the Christian populations 
under Muslim rule. The lack of tranquility which had been persisting in various 
parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as Eastern Anatolia, Macedonia and Crete, was 
already a big threat for the fragile balances within European politics. In this 
respect, retrocession of Thessaly to Ottoman rule would certainly create a new 
scene of quarrel and trouble which could spur the conflict of interests in Europe.  
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Even though the actual belligerents were Greece and the Ottoman Empire, it 
is difficult to regard these states as the real actors of the crisis. This is because, 
neither the aggressive policy of Greece which prompted the war, nor the decisive 
victory of the Ottoman Empire in the battlefield could determine the result. Given 
the neutrality of the other Balkan states, the war was nothing more than a 
circumscribed test of strength. After the outbreak of hostilities the Great Powers 
repeatedly declared that neither of the belligerents would be able to make any 
change on the existing map of Southeastern Europe.39 As articulated by a 
contemporary observer, the Powers “behaved like the managers of a prize-fight. 
They held the stakes… and laid down the rules of the game.”40 The only dangerous 
situation the war could bring forth would be the total defeat and collapse of one 
side. Such a possibility was prevented through a reasonably punctual mediation. 
The Powers did not allow the Ottomans to convert their decisive victory in the 
battlefield to material gains more than a mediocre war indemnity. The military and 
economic losses of Greece that had been caused by the war were offset by the de 
facto termination of Ottoman sovereignty over Crete one year later. This later move 
by the Powers also forestalled probable demands for revenge in Greece. The result 
was completely in accordance with the desire of Europe: Nothing changed in the 
balances and stability was preserved.  
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